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3 **THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY**  
4 **CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS AFFAIRS, AND RELATED AGENCIES**

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14 STATEMENT OF

15  
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17  
18 COMMANDER,

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20 UNITED STATES EUROPEAN COMMAND

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22 BEFORE THE HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
23 SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY CONSTRUCTION, VETERANS AFFAIRS AND  
24 RELATED AGENCIES

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## INTRODUCTION

1           The United States European Command (EUCOM) defends the United States from  
2 forward positions in Europe; protects U.S. citizens; and creates and maintains an environment  
3 that advances U.S. strategic interests. EUCOM's strategic environment has evolved significantly  
4 over the past year, particularly because of Russia's newly assertive posture towards our friends  
5 and Allies, both those on its borders and those who depend on it for energy. This evolution  
6 represents an additional element of the global security spectrum which confronts EUCOM.  
7 Enduring challenges remain: potential regional conflicts, unstable nations with poor governance,  
8 separatist movements, continued challenges from transnational terrorism, violent extremism, and  
9 the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction. Other new challenges confront us in the  
10 realm of cyber security and disputes over territorial and economic claims in the Arctic.

11           Because these challenges are not limited to the traditional geographic confines of Europe,  
12 the Black Sea, and Eurasia, EUCOM is transforming to meet them. Our efforts in Building  
13 Partner Capacity (BPC) promise to be the strongest and most flexible response to this broad  
14 spectrum of threats. EUCOM BPC efforts are the most visible signal of the shift that the  
15 Command has made to focus on enhancing the peace and stability of our area of responsibility,  
16 while at the same time providing our Allies and partners with the tools required to more  
17 effectively operate outside of the traditional Area of Responsibility (AOR). In times of fiscal  
18 constraint, cooperative efforts such as our BPC programs also make more than just strategic  
19 sense.

20           Permanently stationed forces have proven to be an indispensable tool for conducting  
21 effective BPC activities and building trust, confidence, and interoperability with our partner  
22 nations. They are able to solidify the long-term, stable relationships that cannot be built with

1 rotational forces. Permanently assigned forces can conduct BPC activities more frequently and  
2 less expensively than rotational forces, are more responsive and flexible in a crisis, and are  
3 essential to our ability to export security from Europe. Permanently assigned air, land and naval  
4 forces are also those that stand ready to defend U.S. and Allied national sovereignty and vital  
5 national interests and deter any potential adversaries anywhere in the world

6 Investment in maintaining EUCOM's present strength will be repaid many times over in  
7 stronger partners, a more stable environment, and effective action should it become necessary.

8 These security dividends are outlined in our eight long-term Theater Objectives, which also  
9 provide focus and purpose for all EUCOM activities. These Theater Objectives are:

- 10 • EUCOM forces are transformed and expeditionary, trained and ready for global  
11 deployment and prepared to execute joint/multinational operations and training
- 12 • North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is capable and willing to conduct out-of-area  
13 operations
- 14 • European partner nations and organizations work with EUCOM to actively solve  
15 common problems
- 16 • Partner nations have the capacity to provide for their own security and to sustain regional  
17 stability
- 18 • Protection of Allies, partners, and U.S. interests is assured
- 19 • Basing and access support strategic freedom of action and security cooperation activities
- 20 • Russia acts as a responsible partner with the U.S., our Allies, and our partners
- 21 • Local crises are prevented from becoming regional conflicts.

22

1           Of course, no strategy can stand alone. It stands on the daily efforts of all of the Active  
2 Duty and Reserve Component servicemembers assigned to the Command. Ensuring an  
3 appropriate quality of life for the servicemembers who implement this demanding effort is an  
4 essential parallel investment.

5           This Posture Statement will outline the strategic environment, describe the key elements  
6 of EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security, detail the activities of our Service Component  
7 Commands, specify our theater investment needs, and describe EUCOM's support to NATO.  
8

1 **STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT**

2 The EUCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR) includes Europe, Russia, the Caucasus,  
3 Greenland, and the waters within these borders (see Enclosure 1). Composed of 51 independent  
4 states, the AOR is home to approximately 825 million people, 12 percent of the world's  
5 population. Over 200 ethnic groups speak more than 80 languages, profess over 50 religious  
6 affiliations, experience the full range of human conditions, and live under a variety of systems of  
7 government.

8 **Regional Approach**

9 The extent of U.S. interests and relationships within the theater requires a regional  
10 approach focused on engagement in Europe and that part of the EUCOM AOR that lies within  
11 Eurasia. Interregional linkages and secondary effects require theater-level coordination against  
12 transnational challenges that consistently cross traditional geographic, political, and  
13 organizational lines. Often the events in one region are directly associated with effects in  
14 another.

15 **Europe and NATO**

16 The protection from state-based threats the United States has enjoyed for over 60 years is  
17 a product not only of its ocean buffers. Our security in that time has been tied ever more closely  
18 to that of our Allies and partners in Europe. The last six decades have been an unprecedented  
19 period of security, stability, and prosperity. NATO has successfully promoted stability and  
20 security throughout its history and it remains the world's premier security organization. For over  
21 a decade NATO has also undertaken major missions outside of its members' territories, most  
22 recently leading the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan. NATO and  
23 ISAF are central to improving both the security and governance of Afghanistan. They protect

1 Afghanistan's citizens from Taliban and other insurgents and seek to improve the ability of  
2 Afghanistan to protect and govern itself in the future. If ISAF, and hence NATO, fails, it will  
3 have a direct and dire impact on our own future national security.

4 Over the last 20 years, EUCOM has taken the opportunity offered by the emergence of  
5 new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe to shape defense reform, emphasize the rule of  
6 law, and assist in training deployable units to support operations in Afghanistan and Iraq.  
7 Extending NATO membership to a number of Central and Eastern European nations has not only  
8 helped facilitate the spread of democratic values and institutions, it also provided a promise of  
9 security and protection. This is key in areas like the Baltic states, who identify themselves  
10 politically and economically as part of Western Europe and as members of NATO enjoy the  
11 additional security of the Alliance's Article 5 protection. Defense reforms through targeted  
12 security cooperation activities also bring about significant military interoperability between U.S.  
13 and NATO forces. Direct interaction with U.S. forces has succeeded both in developing useful  
14 military capabilities and in establishing reliable Allies whose political and material support has  
15 proven invaluable. In addition, the basing and facilities the United States maintains on Allied  
16 soil enables U.S. global presence, access, and crisis response capability.

17 Not all trends, however, are positive. The defense budgets of many NATO nations have  
18 fallen to levels that jeopardize their ability to sustain operational commitments to both coalition  
19 and NATO-led forces and make long-term strategic military capability commitments to meet the  
20 Alliance's 21st Century missions. The current global economic slowdown may exacerbate this  
21 situation. The demand for the security that NATO and its institutions provide, however, sees no  
22 concurrent slowdown. Indeed, there has never been a greater need for the security NATO and  
23 our European allies can provide, even beyond NATO's borders.

1 Kosovo continues to be a source of instability in the greater Balkan region. After over 8  
2 years as a UN-administered Serbian province, Kosovo declared independence on 17 February  
3 2008. The U.S. recognized the fledgling government and is encouraging the 27 members of the  
4 European Union (EU) to unite in recognizing Kosovo, 22 of which have done so thus far.  
5 Political and diplomatic efforts are expected to continue throughout 2009 as Kosovo prepares to  
6 generally implement the tenets of the Ahtisaari recommendations, although second-order effects  
7 of the 17 February declaration may impede progress.

8 The NATO-led Kosovo Force (KFOR) is the most respected security organization in  
9 Kosovo. It is well positioned, well trained, well prepared, and committed to providing a safe and  
10 secure environment. KFOR has close to 15,000 troops from 32 nations. EUCOM will remain  
11 committed to Kosovo for security cooperation, security assistance, and defense reform for the  
12 long term through the International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Foreign  
13 Military Financing (FMF) programs. EUCOM will assist NATO in training an NCO corps  
14 within the Kosovo Security Force (KSF) and support NATO in the stand up of a Ministry for the  
15 KSF. Additionally, EUCOM will purchase uniforms for the nascent 2,500-man KSF.

16 Significant overall progress has been made in defense reform in the Balkans despite  
17 difficult political, economic, and social challenges. EUCOM is focusing its security cooperation  
18 and BPC programs to help integrate the Balkan nations into the Euro-Atlantic community.  
19 EUCOM activities supported the Adriatic Charter nations (Croatia, Macedonia, and Albania) for  
20 NATO accession at the Bucharest Summit in Apr 08, facilitates Intensified Dialogue for Bosnia-  
21 Herzegovina and Montenegro, and is encouraging Serbia to move closer toward NATO  
22 cooperation.

1           We will work aggressively to accelerate defense reform in the Balkans and address their  
2 toughest issues. These include: training/equipping deployable forces to contribute to stability  
3 operations in Iraq or Afghanistan; establishing human resource management, multi-year  
4 budgeting, organic logistics capability, and building the capacity of defense institutions. A  
5 robust military-to-military relationship, including exercises, high-level visits, State Partnership  
6 Program events, and EUCOM component activities will increase regional stability. We believe  
7 our security cooperation activities will contribute to combating the transnational threat of  
8 terrorism that might be resourced by the abundant stockpiles of small arms, light weapons,  
9 ammo, and man-portable air defense systems endemic to the Balkan region. EUCOM will work  
10 with other agencies and NATO to assist and advocate the destruction of excess stockpiles and to  
11 better secure and manage retained stockpiles. EUCOM will encourage Balkan nations to become  
12 contributing members of the trans-Atlantic family and foster security and stability throughout the  
13 region. NATO presence is a critical enabler toward that goal in this potentially volatile area.

#### 14 **Black Sea/Eurasia**

15           Eurasian nations in EUCOM's theater face a wide spectrum of threats to their security  
16 and stability. This region is the most conflict-plagued area along the Euro-Atlantic perimeter.  
17 Terrorism, illegal arms and drugs trafficking, transnational crime, secessionist pressures, frozen  
18 conflicts, economic crisis, ethnic and religious tensions, and demographic trends challenge  
19 regional cooperation and sustained strategic partnerships. U.S. interests and Western interests  
20 generally in this region require stable, reform-oriented states in control of their own borders, safe  
21 from external military or economic pressures, secure as energy transit routes, and capable of  
22 supporting Alliance/coalition operations. This region is important for a number of significant  
23 reasons some of which include: WMD proliferation, counterterrorism, strategic access to bases

1 and theaters of operation in Central Asia, coalition support, and westbound transit routes for  
2 Caspian energy supplies. Security and stability of this region are necessary to sustain U.S.  
3 interests, operations, and initiatives.

4         The greatest challenge which affects the entire region is how we engage with Russia. We  
5 are in a time of uncertainty in the U.S. - Russian relationship brought about by disagreements  
6 over European security, Russia's role in what it regards as its neighborhood, and Russia's  
7 decision to send forces into Georgia and to recognize the breakaway regions of South Ossetia  
8 and Abkhazia. The refusal of any neighboring country to endorse Russia's recognition of South  
9 Ossetia and Abkhazia reflects regional unease over a revanchist Russia. Russian-European  
10 energy interdependence is a key factor in their broader relationship and calculations. The  
11 relationship with Russia is likely to be more difficult to manage in coming years than any time  
12 since the end of the Cold War. That said, national and NATO efforts are underway to explore  
13 areas where security could be strengthened through arms control regimes, consultations, and  
14 military cooperation.

15         Despite previous progress in our military-to-military cooperation with Russia, events in  
16 Georgia clearly set back expectations for at least the near term. Bilateral military-to-military  
17 cooperation activities were suspended in the aftermath of the conflict in August 2008. Prior to  
18 suspension, Russia took a number of steps that signaled their desire to engage with U.S. forces.  
19 They began fully funding their own participation in activities with U.S. forces - a significant  
20 change from previous years - and ratified the NATO Partnership for Peace Status of Forces  
21 Agreement which is now in effect. Russian leaders, political and military, have signaled that the  
22 door remains open to closer cooperation. Nevertheless their actions in Georgia in August 2008,

1 and with European natural gas supplies in January 2009, suggest that their overall intent may be  
2 to weaken European solidarity and systematically reduce U.S. influence.

3 EUCOM seeks a pragmatic military-to-military relationship with a Russia that is a  
4 responsible partner in security affairs. How we and our European Allies and partners engage  
5 Russia will affect what role Russia plays. While taking steps to assure Allies and partners,  
6 EUCOM stands ready to use the important tool of security cooperation in concert with  
7 interagency partners to rebuild a structure for our bilateral relationship with Russia that allows  
8 wide-ranging and candid engagement on all issues of concern.

9 The Mediterranean Sea and its environs have long been noted as a strategic opening, for  
10 good or ill, into the European heartland. This opening is also now vulnerable to use by violent  
11 extremists, transnational criminal activities, and ballistic missiles. Continued engagement with,  
12 and presence in, the area are also key to our shared security.

13 A secular democracy with a Muslim population, Turkey is an example of the successful  
14 integration of these two elements. It is also geographically, economically, politically, and  
15 militarily critical. Turkey's geostrategic location, European orientation, NATO membership, and  
16 enduring relationship with the U.S. make it a bridge of stability between the Euro-Atlantic  
17 community and the nations of Central Asia and the Arabian Gulf. Its international lines of  
18 communication are an important factor in energy security. Its proximity to Iran, Iraq, Syria and  
19 Russia ensure Turkey will continue to play a vital role in international efforts to combat  
20 terrorism.

21 At the same time, Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK/KGK) terrorist attacks that emanate  
22 from northern Iraq strain the relations between Iraq and Turkey and threaten regional stability.  
23 Earnest dialogue can continue to facilitate the resolution of this problem. While there is no

1 solely military solution to the PKK/KGK terrorist issue, improving Turkey's ability to limit the  
2 organization's ability to cross the border between Iraq and Turkey is an essential step. This will  
3 improve the stability of northern Iraq, contribute to the overall stability of the region, and  
4 increase Turkey's chances of acceptance into the EU.

5         In the Levant, persistent conflict between Israel and Palestinian groups perpetuates  
6 regional instability. While significant, neither the 2006 Israeli war against Hezbollah forces in  
7 Lebanon nor the recent military action against Hamas in Gaza proved decisive in eliminating  
8 immediate threats to Israel's security. February elections for the Israeli Knesset failed to provide  
9 a clear and unequivocal policy mandate for a new government, while infighting between the  
10 Hamas and Fatah factions prevents adoption of a coherent Palestinian position toward Israel.  
11 Thus, in the near term, these enduring challenges to the Middle East peace process ensure that  
12 the outlook for achieving a lasting resolution of these intractable issues remains unsettled. In  
13 order to build prospects for peace and security in the Levant and, by implication, the rest of the  
14 broader Middle East, EUCOM must remain engaged in this vital and volatile region.

15         The Caucasus is an important area for the U.S. and its partners. Caucasus nations  
16 actively support Operation IRAQI FREEDOM and ISAF by providing both with troops and  
17 over-flight access for critical supply lines from EUCOM to the CENTCOM AOR. They provide  
18 alternative energy sources from the Caspian Sea basin and alternative routes of access to Central  
19 Asian energy reserves. It is an important region for European energy diversification.

20         Georgia actively seeks NATO membership and, prior to its withdrawal during the  
21 conflict with Russia, was the number one OIF coalition contributor per capita and second only to  
22 the United Kingdom in terms of total troops. Georgia has also recently approved a resumption of  
23 troop contributions to ISAF. Along with Ukraine, Georgia has requested favorable consideration

1 of a NATO Membership Action Plan. Following the cessation of hostilities with Russia,  
2 EUCOM dispatched assessment teams to Georgia to ascertain the precise status of the Georgian  
3 defense establishment. EUCOM remains committed to helping Georgia become a strong and  
4 capable regional partner in accordance with USG policy.

5 Azerbaijan has taken deliberate steps towards Euro-Atlantic integration, to include  
6 realigning its staff structures to NATO standards, training a company to NATO standards under  
7 the Operational Capabilities Concept, and it recently began a Strategic Defense Review which  
8 the U.S. is leading with support from Latvia, Lithuania, and possibly Turkey. Its close proximity  
9 to Iran, Russia, and Caspian Sea energy resources makes it important to U.S. strategic interests.  
10 Azerbaijan provides an alternative energy source for our European Allies. An example of the  
11 region's growing importance to the global market is the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline, bringing  
12 oil from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean.

13 Furthermore, Azerbaijan's support to the U.S. in global security has been substantial,  
14 including being a troop contributor to KFOR, ISAF and OIF. Until recently, Azerbaijan had 151  
15 troops deployed to Iraq, and recently doubled its ISAF commitment to 90 soldiers. In January  
16 2007, Azerbaijan extended blanket diplomatic overflight clearance for U.S. government and  
17 contract flights in support of OEF and OIF – extremely important from both political and  
18 operational points of view.

19 Some nations of the Caucasus are exporting security by actively supporting efforts to  
20 fight terrorism, but continued corruption and a lack of transparency limit progress with defense  
21 reform efforts in this region. Internecine conflicts also continue to challenge security and long-  
22 term stability in the region. Armenia and Azerbaijan are stalemated over Nagorno-Karabakh; the  
23 status of Transdnistra has not been officially defined; South Ossetia and Abkhazia recently

1 declared independence from Georgia, declarations which were immediately recognized by their  
2 *de facto* patron state, Russia. These conflicts will remain significant obstacles to long-term  
3 regional stability.

4 Early optimism as a result of the Ukrainian Orange Revolution has faded as crisis and  
5 uncertainty undermined the functioning of domestic institutions and increased tensions with  
6 Russia. Ukraine, nevertheless, remains an important bridge between East and West. Its strategic  
7 location, contributions to international operations, and its government's policy of Euro-Atlantic  
8 integration make it an increasingly important regional partner. The Ukrainian government's  
9 desire to achieve Western standards of political, economic, and defense reform represents a sharp  
10 break with its Cold War past. Like Georgia, it has recently requested favorable consideration of  
11 a NATO Membership Action Plan. It is the only non-NATO nation providing or offering forces  
12 to all four major NATO operations: ISAF, NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I), KFOR, and  
13 ACTIVE ENDEAVOR.

#### 14 **Transnational Terrorism**

15 There is a growing awareness among many nations in the EUCOM AOR of violent  
16 extremist threats to their populations. Attacks in Europe during recent years demonstrate intent  
17 to extend the battlefield beyond Iraq and Afghanistan. While attacks during 2008 were fewer  
18 than previous years, partner nation law enforcement officials continued to uncover terror plots  
19 and arrest terrorism suspects with alarming regularity. EUCOM continues to deal with the threat  
20 of terrorism in all its forms.

21 Many violent extremist groups are integrally tied to criminal and smuggling networks.  
22 Illegal activities such as narcotics trafficking, document forgery, and credit card fraud help fund  
23 extremist operations while Europe's open borders facilitate travel across the region. Terrorists

1 clearly wish to use Europe and Eurasia as sanctuaries and logistics centers. Additionally, there is  
2 a growing trend of extremist organizations recruiting and training Western European citizens and  
3 returning them to Europe to launch attacks targeting U.S. and Allied installations and personnel.

#### 4 **Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD)**

5 The acquisition and potential employment of WMD by state and non-state actors pose a  
6 security threat to the United States and our partners and Allies. The majority of the world's  
7 nuclear weapons are located within the EUCOM AOR. In Europe and Eurasia, stockpiles of  
8 nuclear materiel may become vulnerable by varying degrees to access, damage, illicit diversion,  
9 or removal by international and internal threats via corruption, criminal activity, insider threats,  
10 and inadequate border monitoring. Coordination with the Department of State and strengthening  
11 our nonproliferation and counterproliferation efforts is increasingly important.

#### 12 **U.S. EUROPEAN COMMAND STRATEGY**

13 The EUCOM Strategy of Active Security (SAS) is EUCOM's plan for performing the  
14 tasks assigned by the Secretary of Defense. The SAS looks out five years and aims at two  
15 overarching strategic objectives: "Defend the Homeland" and "Create and Maintain an  
16 Environment that Advances U.S. Strategic and Economic Interests." The diversity of the  
17 security environments, regional political relations, culture, geography, and our partners' needs  
18 make it useful to divide our AOR into two regions, Europe and Black Sea-Eurasia.

19 European nations, particularly those that are NATO members, are for political, security,  
20 economic, and cultural reasons our historical and enduring Allies. They contribute to stability  
21 both within and beyond the region; they are net exporters of security. Their granting basing  
22 rights on their territory contributes directly to U.S. global strategic reach.

1           The majority of the nations in the Black Sea-Eurasia region are at strategic crossroads in  
2 terms of security, political, and economic reform. Their desire to move closer to Euro-Atlantic  
3 security institutions can lead ultimately to greater security and prosperity, but they also face  
4 challenges. “Frozen conflicts” have the potential to break out into conventional war with  
5 devastating economic and political consequences; terrorism and the possible proliferation of  
6 WMD threaten populations on an unprecedented scale and undermine government authority. In  
7 both regions, Russia seems determined see Euro-Atlantic security institutions weakened and has  
8 shown a readiness to use economic leverage and military force to achieve its aims.

### 9 **Strategic Approach**

10           The SAS focuses on maintaining a high state of military readiness and using these forces  
11 to conduct a wide range of security cooperation activities. Because the capabilities and high  
12 readiness of EUCOM forces strengthen the desire of other nations to train with them, these are  
13 mutually reinforcing lines of activity. Our strategic approach promotes stable environments,  
14 protects U.S. interests, and reduces the likelihood of crises erupting into larger conflicts by  
15 maintaining and strengthening alliances, partnerships, influence, and access where we have long-  
16 standing relationships and creating and expanding influence into new areas of the theater.

### 17 **Theater Objectives and Priorities**

18           Our strategy identifies eight previously-identified *long-term Theater Objectives* (written  
19 in the form of effects we want to achieve) that provide focus and purpose for EUCOM’s  
20 activities:

- 21       • EUCOM forces are transformed and expeditionary, trained and ready for global  
22       deployment and prepared to execute joint/multinational operations and training
- 23       • NATO is capable and willing to conduct out-of-area operations

- 1 • European partner nations and organizations work with EUCOM to actively solve
- 2 common problems
- 3 • Partner nations have the capacity to provide for their own security and to sustain regional
- 4 stability
- 5 • Protection of Allies, partners, and U.S. interests is assured
- 6 • Basing and access support strategic freedom of action and security cooperation activities
- 7 • Russia acts as a responsible partner with the U.S., our Allies, and our partners
- 8 • Local crises are prevented from becoming regional conflicts.

9 Additionally, in the *near term* these objectives lead to the following *strategic priorities*:

- 10 • Support for the International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan and
- 11 Operation IRAQI FREEDOM.
- 12 • Maintain relevance of, and U.S. leadership within, NATO.
- 13 • Increase integration of EUCOM activities with the rest of the U.S. Government,
- 14 especially in combating terrorism and WMD proliferation.
- 15 • Engage Russia or mitigate any potentially negative influence.
- 16 • Support improved energy security for Europe, Eurasia, and the Black Sea region, to
- 17 include NATO and USEUCOM.
- 18 • Support NATO Transformation for out-of-area operations.
- 19 • Ensure EUCOM's end-state transformation and basing ensures EUCOM has the
- 20 capabilities to accomplish all assigned missions and tasks.

21 Moving rapidly toward the Strategy of Active Security's objectives requires that EUCOM  
22 transform both its basing and its forces.

23



1 Guard and Reserve forces have enabled us to mitigate risk, while programs such as the National  
2 Guard's State Partnership Program (SPP) have helped us achieve our theater goals.

### 3 **Strategic Theater Transformation**

4 In this context, EUCOM's Strategic Theater Transformation (STT) plan implements a  
5 basing strategy that sustains and leverages commitments to our long-standing Allies and partners  
6 and U.S. operations in other theaters, such as ISAF, OEF, and OIF.

7 EUCOM's STT plan includes retaining eight fighter aircraft squadrons in the U.K.,  
8 Germany, and Italy. For ground forces, it includes two permanently stationed infantry brigade  
9 combat teams — a Stryker Brigade Combat Team in Germany and an Airborne Brigade Combat  
10 Team (ABCT) in Italy — along with two heavy Brigade Combat Teams in Germany. Although  
11 these two brigades are scheduled to return to CONUS in 2012 and 2013, I have recommended  
12 and continue to recommend that we retain them in EUCOM. As I discuss in the USAREUR  
13 section, these forces contribute directly to our dissuasion and deterrence efforts. They increase  
14 our flexibility in dealing with crises and over time progressively increase the capability of  
15 friendly forces because of their ability to build partner capacity. Retention of this force level  
16 must be planned carefully, since EUCOM's STT plan is closely synchronized with OSD, the  
17 Joint Staff, individual Services, and NATO to ensure that global efforts of other Combatant  
18 Commands, NATO, and the results of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) Commission  
19 process are mutually supportive. STT aims at improving our effectiveness and operational  
20 flexibility, but it has at the same time significantly reduced costs. The fact remains, however, that  
21 forward stationed units meet the same deployment schedules to Afghanistan and Iraq as CONUS  
22 units but, when at home station, are able to establish the long term relationships with partner

1 countries that are essential to BPC. In addition, studies show that rotating multiple units from  
2 the CONUS to Europe is more expensive than forward stationing a single unit.

3 Since this process began in 2003, EUCOM has closed 43 bases and installations and  
4 returned approximately 11,000 servicemembers and 16,000 family members to the United  
5 States. Present EUCOM force strength is approximately 84,000 military members. Retention of  
6 EUCOM's forces at the current level will enable the accomplishment of assigned missions and  
7 tasks.

### 8 **SECURITY COOPERATION**

9 For any given level of U.S. military presence, an increase in our partners' capacity  
10 disproportionately strengthens our ability to maintain security—not only because of its direct  
11 effects but because of its synergistic effects as well.

12 Security Cooperation (SC) programs remain the foundation of EUCOM's BPC efforts.  
13 The direct impact of the combat power of overseas-stationed U.S. forces is amplified when their  
14 presence, example, and their ability to conduct combined exercises are employed in EUCOM  
15 BPC efforts. These programs contribute to building the vital relationships that bolster U.S.  
16 strategic interests, enhance partner security capabilities, provide essential access (particularly to  
17 en-route infrastructure), and improve information exchange and intelligence sharing.

18 Our security cooperation BPC efforts are the central aspect of our strategy because they  
19 offer the most intense form of foreign partner interaction in peacetime. Through BPC activities  
20 such as those executed through the Foreign Military Financing Program, Joint Contact Team  
21 Program, Section 1206, the International Military Education and Training Program, Warsaw  
22 Initiative Funding (WIF), the Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program, and the Global  
23 Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI) we anticipate not only the strengthening of our relationships

1 with existing Allies, but also the development of new relationships with additional partner  
2 countries.

3 Our SC programs identify low-cost, high-impact engagement initiatives to build  
4 relationships that will shape the security environment in which we engage. A major focus of our  
5 efforts is building partner capacity with strategically important nations seeking to enhance their  
6 own security. EUCOM's assigned units provide frequent engagement at all levels. These  
7 engagements build habitual relationships and trust and provide critical continuity. EUCOM  
8 facilities and programs, ranging from airborne exercises to non-lethal weapons instruction,  
9 provide practical and state-of-the-art training that strengthens relationships and increases the  
10 capacity of our Allies and partners. For example, during FY2008, HQ EUCOM and United  
11 States Army Europe (USAREUR) programmed and coordinated the execution of the Unit Level  
12 Event ADRIATIC AURORA. This combined arms familiarization exercise brought together  
13 Croatian, Albanian, and Macedonian forces with their respective State Partners (Minnesota, New  
14 Jersey, and Vermont National Guard) to emphasize coalition operations in an effort to improve  
15 regional security.

16 EUCOM's BPC efforts to help partners develop the capacity to conduct effective  
17 peacekeeping and contingency operations help mitigate the conditions that lead to conflict.  
18 These efforts will ensure that we can work effectively with our Allies and partners should  
19 conflict arise. EUCOM BPC efforts require consistent and predictable investment in order to  
20 have an impact on the multitude of strategic, security, economic, and political challenges we  
21 face.

22 EUCOM is working with OSD, the Joint Staff, and other COCOMs to address these  
23 issues and increase the Department's capabilities to build partner capacity to contribute to

1 coalition operations. Such programs would address critical capability gaps in coalition partners  
2 that we have been unable to satisfy due to declining FMF levels in Europe and, as with DoD's  
3 other train and equip authorities, would be implemented with the concurrence of the Secretary of  
4 State. Our desired end state is increased partner nation participation in current operations so we  
5 can alleviate pressure on U.S. troops as the sole source for deployments.

## 6 **Security Cooperation Programs**

7 EUCOM also builds partner capacity by executing security assistance programs using our  
8 44 Offices of Defense Cooperation who work with the host nation in close partnership with U.S.  
9 Embassy Country Teams and under the direction of the U.S. Ambassador. The Title 22 IMET  
10 and FMS programs are central to our BPC Efforts.

11 *International Military Education and Training (IMET) and Expanded IMET (E-IMET)*  
12 provide education and training opportunities for foreign military and civilian personnel. During  
13 FY08, the IMET program sent 1,514 students to 2,510 schools/courses on U.S. military  
14 installations and learning centers. The final FY08 EUCOM IMET allocation of \$24.7M was a  
15 decrease of about 7 percent from the final FY07 IMET allocation of \$26.9M. IMET remains our  
16 most powerful SC tool and proves its long-term value every day. For a relatively small  
17 investment, it provides foreign military and civilian leaders access to U.S. military training,  
18 builds relationships, and expands influence. Indeed, today's IMET graduates are tomorrow's  
19 Chiefs of Defense, Ministers of Defense, and Heads of State.

20 We continue to see the value of this program in the professional development and  
21 transformation of militaries in such established partners as Poland, Romania, and many other  
22 countries. The importance of IMET to our BPC efforts cannot be overstated, and we appreciate  
23 Congress' continued support in sustaining and increasing this valuable Title 22 resource.

1            *Foreign Military Financing (FMF)* provides critical resources to assist strategically  
2 important nations without the financial means to acquire U.S. military equipment and training.  
3 EUCOM's FMF increases over the past years are due solely to increases in the directed funding  
4 for Israel. When the mandated amounts for Israel are removed, the remainder of EUCOM's  
5 FMF has steadily decreased (FY07, \$170M; FY08, \$160M; FY09, \$140M). Additional directed  
6 spending further restricts what can be undertaken with the available funds, and have resulted in  
7 delayed or cancelled programs meant to improve Allied and partner abilities and create  
8 significant impediments to the implementation of our BPC efforts.

9            FMF is an essential instrument of influence, building allied and coalition military  
10 capabilities and improving interoperability with U.S. and other Allied forces. When countries  
11 buy U.S. military equipment through the FMF program, they also buy into a long-term  
12 commitment for spare parts and training. Failing to fully fund vital FMF programs in any of  
13 these nations can unintentionally send negative messages.

14            *Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)* demonstrate our  
15 nation's continued commitment to the security of our Allies and partners by allowing them to  
16 acquire U.S. military equipment and training. FMS and DCS are vital to improving  
17 interoperability with U.S. and NATO forces, closing capability gaps, and modernizing the  
18 military forces of our Allies and partners.

19            *Section 1206 of the FY06 National Defense Authorization Act* coupled State Department  
20 authorities with DoD resources to build and enhance the military capacity of our key partners. In  
21 FY08, EUCOM received \$18.7M to conduct innovative train and equip programs for partners  
22 interested in assisting the U.S. in current operations and providing security and stability  
23 throughout the AOR. A prime example is the improved national capacity of Azerbaijan and

1 Albania to conduct counterterrorist operations in seaborne interdiction operations and coastal  
2 patrols. Section 1206 authority and corresponding appropriations are key tools that EUCOM will  
3 continue to utilize to build partner capacity.

4       The *National Guard State Partnership Program (SPP)*, See Enclosure 2) continues to be  
5 one of our most effective BPC programs, with 20 states currently participating. By linking  
6 American states with designated partner countries, we promote access, enhance military  
7 capabilities, improve interoperability, and advance the principles of responsible governance. The  
8 unique civil-military nature of the National Guard allows it to participate actively in a wide range  
9 of security cooperation activities and help bridge the gap between DoD and DoS responsibilities.

10       In 2008 alone, the National Guard conducted over 90 SPP events and, along with  
11 members of the Army and Air Force Reserve, participated in over 150 of 527 Joint Contact  
12 Team Program (JCTP) activities. For example, the Oklahoma Army National Guard and its SPP  
13 partner Azerbaijan executed an extremely successful SPP medical outreach exercise that  
14 administered medical examinations and care to thousands of Azeris – an immediate impact with  
15 long-term implications.

16       Also in 2008, *Traditional Commanders Activity (TCA)* funding supported roughly 400  
17 bilateral military-to-military engagement events. These important events strengthened military  
18 ties with our partners and forged new relationships at the senior enlisted to mid-grade officer  
19 levels. These relationships translate into long-term linkages that pay future dividends at the  
20 Chief of Defense level. FY09 TCA funding level is \$10.3M with a reduction from the FY08  
21 appropriation of \$12.3M.

22       *Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) Proliferation* is among our highest  
23 priorities as the majority of the world's nuclear weapons are located in the EUCOM AOR. The

1 Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is a Combat Support Agency in support of EUCOM  
2 to cover the entire spectrum of this unique mission. Cooperative Threat Reduction programs  
3 seek to stem the proliferation of known WMD; detection programs address counter-proliferation,  
4 particularly interdiction of unknown items; and DTRA's exercise programs address our  
5 consequence management responsibilities, reassuring our partners and Allies about EUCOM  
6 capabilities.

7 State Department-led programs such as the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear  
8 Terrorism and the Proliferation Security Initiative focus on denial of access at the source, build  
9 capacity for interdiction in transit, and form the most effective framework to prevent the use of  
10 WMD. In this regard, the Nunn-Lugar program has been very successful in mitigating the risk  
11 posed by WMD through non-proliferation projects that reduce and secure WMD materials and  
12 weapons. In recent years, the Nunn-Lugar program has expanded into building partner capacity  
13 to interdict WMD in transit, making it a significant aspect of the counter-WMD effort.

14 Additionally, for the past three years USAREUR has provided *Tactical Human*  
15 *Intelligence (HUMINT) Collection and Management Training* to our NATO Allies, including  
16 Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. Recently, the initiative led to the training of the HUMINT force  
17 in the Romanian Army. As a result, Romanian HUMINT teams have been embedded within  
18 U.S. forces during the last two Balkans rotations. We look forward to expanding this program to  
19 other countries in the AOR eager to build needed military capabilities.

20 EUCOM conducts multiple *Humanitarian Assistance (HA) Programs* to assist  
21 populations in need and to shape perceptions and the security environment while also showing  
22 the U.S. and the Department of Defense in a positive light. This is especially necessary in areas  
23 susceptible to the adoption of extremist ideologies or where general discontent and lack of hope

1 are potential breeding grounds for instability. EUCOM continues to focus these important  
2 humanitarian initiatives in the most vulnerable locations and emphasize the importance of this  
3 strategic tool.

4 EUCOM's HA programs consist of the Humanitarian and Civic Assistance (HCA)  
5 Program, the Humanitarian Assistance-Other (HA-Other) Program, and Humanitarian Assistance  
6 Program-Excess Property (HAP-EP).

7 Projects funded through these resources complement USAID efforts, enhance regional  
8 security cooperation, and advance U.S. interests throughout the region. These valuable efforts  
9 also train U.S. troops while generating a positive public image of the Command and the nation.  
10 They also bolster a country's capability to respond to disasters, thereby diminishing the need for  
11 future U.S. involvement, and provide an example of the value of a professional military beyond  
12 wartime events. While the EUCOM HA budget is small compared to other BPC activities, it has  
13 a disproportionately high impact as a very visible and positive engagement activity.

14 For FY08, EUCOM executed \$5.2M in HA Project funding for 135 security assistance  
15 related projects in 17 countries. In addition to this outreach through security assistance-type HA  
16 projects, the Command also provided \$15.4M in HA Disaster Relief funding in FY08 for airlift  
17 and relief supplies as part of Operation ASSURED DELIVERY in support of the Republic of  
18 Georgia following the Russian incursion. HA Project funding for FY09 is \$6.35M and will once  
19 again encompass approximately 17 countries in the eastern portion of the EUCOM AOR.

20 EUCOM is also an active participant in DoD's *U.S. Humanitarian Mine Action* (HMA)  
21 Program. HMA's goal is to relieve the plight of civilian populations experiencing adverse  
22 effects from landmines and other explosive remnants of war. In this capacity, it promotes  
23 economic stability and growth by reclaiming farmland critical to a nation's survival. The

1 EUCOM HMA Program is currently engaging 22 countries on two continents with a focus on  
2 “training the trainer” to assist mine victims, develop demining capabilities, and enhance mine-  
3 risk educational programs.

4 EUCOM's *Caspian Regional Maritime Security Cooperation* efforts aim to coordinate  
5 and complement U.S. government maritime security cooperation activities in Azerbaijan,  
6 Kazakhstan, and more recently, Turkmenistan. Maritime security cooperation efforts seek to  
7 build and enhance our partners' capacity to prevent or respond to terrorism, proliferation, drug  
8 trafficking, and additional transnational threats in the littorals. EUCOM and United States Naval  
9 Forces Europe (NAVEUR) continue to promote Maritime Safety and Security and Maritime  
10 Domain Awareness in the Caspian Sea through routine engagement with our partners in the  
11 region.

12 The Caspian Sea's location on the EUCOM-CENTCOM seam, and the critical support  
13 Caspian nations provide for Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM, make  
14 coordination between EUCOM/NAVEUR and CENTCOM/Naval Forces Central Command  
15 (NAVCENT) critical to promoting security efforts in the region. EUCOM's biennial Caspian  
16 Regional Security Working Group meetings, as well as NAVEUR's and NAVCENT's shared  
17 flag-level visits, provide formally coordinated interaction and unity of message.

18 The *George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies* is the original of five such  
19 centers supported by the Department of Defense. Cosponsored by the U.S. and German  
20 governments, it provides professional development to emerging civilian and military leaders,  
21 reinforces ideals of democratic governance and stable apolitical militaries, and facilitates long-  
22 term dialogue with and among current and future international leaders. As significant, it has  
23 built an active network of Euro-Atlantic minded security experts. Its strong reputation in the

1 region has made it an essential asset in the execution of EUCOM's regional strategy. Marshall  
2 Center alumni represent a community of more than 6,000 security sector leaders from over 100  
3 nations, including nearly 200 distinguished alumni who have risen to parliamentary and  
4 ministerial leadership levels of government, have become senior defense officials, or advanced to  
5 their nation's highest military ranks. This network has proven invaluable for harmonizing views  
6 on common security challenges in the region. The Marshall Center has played a significant role  
7 in building the capacity of new and aspiring NATO members. Since 1994, NATO has admitted  
8 ten new countries and almost 2,000 participants from these ten countries have attended Marshall  
9 Center resident programs; almost 28% of total participants over this time period.

10 The Marshall Center provides a range of resident and non-resident security educational  
11 programs that are essential to EUCOM's effort to enhance the security sector capacity of our  
12 Allies and partners. The Marshall Center's focus is on developing partner capabilities for  
13 democratic governance, combating terrorism, conducting stability operations and homeland  
14 defense. Marshall Center programs and activities serve as vital strategic communications  
15 platforms, greatly enhancing our ability to explain and elicit partner nation support for combating  
16 a host of shared security challenges.

17 *The Defense Environmental International Cooperation (DEIC)* program is another low-  
18 cost, high-impact program that is reaping dividends beyond its focus area. Established in FY01,  
19 the annual worldwide DoD budget for the DEIC program is less than two million dollars with the  
20 FY09 DEIC funding level for the EUCOM AOR set at \$200,000. The cost of a typical project or  
21 event ranges from \$10,000 to \$80,000. As an example, the Baltic Sea Spill Response Exercise  
22 focused on host nations' capabilities, plans, and procedures. Representatives from Azerbaijan,  
23 Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Sweden, and Ukraine

1 participated in this successful exercise. A second significant DEIC engagement activity was the  
2 Sustainability Workshop, held in October 2007 in Bucharest, Romania, with a focus on the new  
3 Romanian military strategy and its effect on the environment. Discussions in the workshop  
4 centered on sustainable training ranges, land rehabilitation, and Geographic Information  
5 Systems. Planned engagement activities for FY09 include projects in Integrated Training Area  
6 Management, encroachment, field drinking water supply, and marine spill response.

7 *Partnership for Peace (PfP)* exercises support efforts to deepen defense and military  
8 cooperation between the U.S., NATO, and PfP partners. Application of DoD Warsaw Initiative  
9 Funds (WIF) to PfP activities has proven successful in building partner nation participation and  
10 cooperation in theater. FY09 WIF funding for the EUCOM Theater is \$16M, an increase of 8%  
11 percent over FY08 funding. DoD WIF provides an important source of funding for a number of  
12 partner countries that would otherwise be unable to participate in these important activities.  
13 DoD WIF pays for partner participation in NATO/PfP and “*In the Spirit of PfP*” exercises and  
14 conferences, defense institution building, the Civil Military Emergency Preparedness Program  
15 (CMEP) and OSD interoperability events that include U.S. participation.

16 Regional cooperation through PfP greatly facilitates U.S. access to bases and overflight  
17 rights in the prosecution of current and future operations. Several PfP nations have provided  
18 basing, force protection at bases, and personnel to operations in Afghanistan and Iraq. Through  
19 PfP-sponsored exercises, Eastern European and Central Asian states have gained familiarity with  
20 U.S. forces, methodologies, and leadership. Without this pre-established relationship, support to  
21 U.S. operations would be harder to secure and incorporate.

22 WIF-supported PfP activities have also been remarkably successful in preparing nations  
23 for full NATO membership. Ten PfP states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary,

1 Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia) have become NATO members  
2 since the program's inception. These new NATO members and twelve other PfP states (Albania,  
3 Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Croatia, Finland, Georgia, Ireland, Macedonia, Sweden,  
4 Switzerland, and Ukraine) provide forces to ISAF/OEF/OIF and Kosovo.

5 EUCOM's *Clearinghouse Initiatives* ensure that BPC actions are coordinated with other  
6 nations involved in the same region or issue. Clearinghouse Initiatives help deconflict programs,  
7 avoid duplication, and find ways to collaborate on matters of mutual interest. They exist in the  
8 South Caucasus and Southeast Europe and enable interested countries to share information about  
9 security assistance programs. The goal is to capitalize on limited resources by merging various  
10 BPC programs into a comprehensive, synchronized regional effort.

#### 11 **BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE (BMD)**

12 Taken together, the programs detailed above provide the initial preparation of the U.S.,  
13 our Allies and partners for the full range of military and full-spectrum threats in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century.

14 Some threats have developed to the point where a more direct response is required. At  
15 the upper end of the technological spectrum is the spread of nuclear, chemical, and biological  
16 weapons and ballistic missiles that can be used to deliver them. Iran already possesses ballistic  
17 missiles that can reach parts of Europe and is developing missiles that can reach most of Europe.  
18 Iran also continues to threaten one of our key regional allies with its advancing missile  
19 technology. In response, the U.S. deployed an X-Band Radar to provide advanced early warning  
20 indications. Entirely defensive in nature, the radar provides additional warning time to execute  
21 defensive counter-measures. By 2015 Iran may also deploy an Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
22 (ICBM) capable of reaching all of Europe and parts of the U.S.



1 conditions that foster violent extremism, and denying extremists freedom of action and access to  
2 resources.

3 We will continue our work to deter, interdict, or defeat violent extremism wherever it  
4 appears. These efforts involve close cooperation with other Geographic Combatant Commands,  
5 the United States Special Operations Command, U.S. Government agencies and departments,  
6 and perhaps most importantly, a growing list of foreign partners with the same desire to protect  
7 their societies from the threat of terrorism. While much of this collaboration remains outside the  
8 public arena, it is vitally important to sustaining a shared view of the enemy threat and enhancing  
9 mutual support for counter-terrorism efforts.

10 As detailed in the Component Activities sections below, EUCOM-stationed forces  
11 continue to be heavily engaged in ongoing combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as  
12 in building partner nation and coalition capacity supporting these operations. 87% of all  
13 ISAF/NATO contributors to Afghanistan and 75% of all coalition partners in Iraq came from the  
14 EUCOM AOR.

15 Outside of direct support to combat operations, EUCOM-based forces are in the forefront  
16 of promoting the transformation of European militaries. The engagement with, and support to,  
17 our Allies and partners underlines the importance of persistent presence of U.S. forces for  
18 building effective expeditionary capacity for multilateral theater and global operations.

### **COMPONENT COMMAND ACTIVITIES**

19 EUCOM's four theater Service Components – U.S. Army Europe, (USAREUR), U.S. Air  
20 Forces in Europe (USAFE), U.S. Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR), U.S. Marine Corps Forces  
21 Europe (MARFOREUR), and its functional subordinate unified command for special operations,  
22 Special Operations Command Europe (SOCEUR), are responsible for supporting our Theater

1 Campaign Plan (TCP) and implementation of our Theater Security Cooperation (TSC) program  
2 across the AOR. Headquartered in Heidelberg, Ramstein, Naples, and Stuttgart respectively, the  
3 Components provide critical capabilities necessary to build military capacity among our partners  
4 and allies, support military requirements, and promote vital national security interests through  
5 the use of military power.

### **United States Army Europe (USAREUR)**

6 EUCOM-assigned U.S. Army forces continue to provide extensive support to ongoing  
7 combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, and throughout the CENTCOM AOR. These forces are  
8 heavily engaged in EUCOM's efforts to build partner military capacity while providing an  
9 intrinsic expeditionary posture through strategic positioning and power projection of forward-  
10 stationed combat formations from sanctuaries in Europe.

11 *Full Spectrum Operations.* USAREUR remains decisively engaged in the effort to  
12 combat global terrorism and extremism. During the past year, all USAREUR combat brigades  
13 returned from, or deployed to, ISAF/Operations ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI  
14 FREEDOM. The 172nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT) and 2nd Brigade, 1<sup>st</sup> Armored Division  
15 are currently deployed to Iraq. The 1st Armored Division headquarters and 2nd Stryker Cavalry  
16 Regiment (2SCR) returned from Iraq and are replacing their battle losses and repairing their  
17 critical equipment (RESET program). The 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team (173ABCT)  
18 returned from Afghanistan, completed their RESET, and is in what is called their dwell window.  
19 This is time spent at home station after combat and operational deployments of 12 months or  
20 longer and is currently at least 12 months. Additionally, USAREUR has been an essential force  
21 provider by deploying the 12th Combat Aviation Brigade; the 18th Military Police Brigade; the

1 18th Engineer Brigade; and separate Military Police, Engineer, and Signal battalions plus  
2 numerous companies/detachments in support of ISAF, OEF and OIF.

3 USAREUR was the centerpiece of the United States humanitarian assistance mission in  
4 Georgia as its conflict with Russia unfolded. The 21st Theater Sustainment Command provided  
5 the core of the EUCOM Military Assessment Team (EMAT). Correspondingly, USAREUR  
6 provided expertise to the EUCOM Joint Assessment Team (EJAT) as they evaluated Georgia's  
7 military capacity and capabilities.

8 USAREUR continues to provide key logistical support to forces in Kosovo, Iraq,  
9 Afghanistan, Africa, and throughout the EUCOM AOR. Likewise, USAREUR is the Army  
10 Force headquarters for EUCOM's numerous named contingency operations.

11 It is imperative that USAREUR, as the Army Service Component Command of EUCOM,  
12 have the capabilities, capacity, enablers, and resident core competencies to perform as a  
13 Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) or Combined Joint Force Land Component Commander  
14 (CJFLCC) in full spectrum operations across the AOR. A review of EUCOM force capability  
15 requirements has shown that USAREUR must retain the current four BCTs and Division HQ  
16 structure to deter aggression; promote security and stability; bolster relations with Allies and  
17 partners, and project U.S. combat power.

18 *Building Partner Capacity and Coalition Capabilities.* The protracted nature of conflict  
19 in this dynamic 21st century security environment highlights the increased importance of  
20 multinational partnerships and joint/combined interoperability in meeting common security  
21 objectives. The persistent presence of U.S. Army forces in Europe is critical to assisting our  
22 Allies and partners as they build such capabilities. In addition to the deployment of its own  
23 formations, USAREUR plays a leading role in promoting and enabling the transformation of

1 armies across the EUCOM AOR into effective expeditionary partners for current and future  
2 multinational operations.

3         Since 2005, USAREUR's Joint Multinational Training Command (JMTC) in Germany  
4 has trained numerous battalion equivalents from more than 20 Allied and partner nations for  
5 deployment to ISAF, OIF, and the KFOR mission. JMTC training focuses on building  
6 expeditionary competencies and increasing interoperability between and among partner nations'  
7 militaries through collective multinational training. JMTC has the ability to engage in even  
8 greater BPC events if the proper authorities can be granted. Existing funding to train and equip  
9 General Purpose Forces of coalition partners are limited. To overcome this obstacle, we are  
10 working within the DoD and with the DoS to develop a proposal for seeking adequate funding.

11         Recognizing the importance of its contribution to EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security  
12 (SAS), USAREUR continues to execute a robust schedule of bilateral and multilateral exercises  
13 across the AOR. While deploying its organic units to the current conflicts, USAREUR is  
14 sustaining, redeploying, and resetting those forces upon return from combat. USAREUR  
15 employs its remaining forces to execute a wide range of mil-to-mil events and exercises. In  
16 FY08, USAREUR conducted 15 such exercises in Albania, Croatia, Georgia, Israel, Morocco,  
17 Poland, and Ukraine, as well as a host of others throughout the EUCOM and AFRICOM AORs.  
18 These exercises enhanced joint and combined interoperability to lay the foundation for potential  
19 future multinational operations. USAREUR has become well-versed in integrating Reserve  
20 Component organizations while performing its ASCC mission. The breadth and scope of  
21 USAREUR's ASCC, Executive Agent, and Title 10 requirements in support of EUCOM, and a  
22 COCOM supporting headquarters to AFRICOM are substantial and continue to evolve. Current  
23 and future mission requirements in support of Theater Ballistic Missile Defense may well direct

1 the USAREUR Air Missile Defense Detachment to increase capability. These requirements are  
2 a moving target and will demand considerable flexibility to identify and resource them in the  
3 near- to mid-term.

4 *Setting an Expeditionary Posture.* USAREUR is executing its plan to consolidate its  
5 footprint across Europe on a timeline synchronized with BRAC requirements and the modular  
6 transformation of enduring Army forces. By the end of 2009, USAREUR will have transformed  
7 into the new Theater Army functional staff configuration. This process is well under way with  
8 the merger of V Corps and USAREUR staffs to form a consolidated ASCC headquarters. When  
9 all transformation actions are complete in 2015, USAREUR's brigades and separate battalions  
10 will be fully restructured and efficiently garrisoned across six Main Operating Bases (MOB):  
11 Wiesbaden, Grafenwoehr-Vilseck/Hohenfels, Ansbach, Baumholder, and Kaiserslautern,  
12 Germany and Vicenza, Italy.

13 Although USAREUR is reducing its footprint across the AOR, its forward presence  
14 affords unique advantages across the entire range of EUCOM missions. Habitual relationships  
15 are foundational to effective BPC initiatives. The relationships between USAREUR's  
16 formations and host nation, Allied, and partner nation armies across the AOR pay significant  
17 dividends every day for this command. Instilling trust and confidence in our Allies and partners  
18 to effectively and efficiently work together in multinational operations is an investment that we  
19 are making in regional and global security. It is part of an expeditionary model that catalyzes  
20 transformational efforts through more frequent engagement and continuity, builds habitual  
21 relationships and trust, and provides opportunities for partners to train alongside formations--  
22 increasing interoperability and expanding confidence and willingness of our allies and partners to  
23 participate in multinational operations.

1           USAREUR's largest AOR expeditionary mission in terms of fiscal resources and troops-  
2 to-task commitments is JTF-E. This DoD-directed initiative is designed to support a full time  
3 training effort in Romania and Bulgaria. In addition, JTF-E provides the logistical base for  
4 United States Air Forces in Europe and Special Operations Command Europe exercises in  
5 Eastern Europe and Eurasia. This past winter, USAREUR had commitments from the U.S. Air  
6 Force to plan, coordinate, and execute a significant multinational exercise. Likewise, we expect  
7 both the Dutch forces and U.S. Marines to hold short rotations in conjunction with JTF-E  
8 rotations. USAREUR provides surge staff to support these requirements. USAREUR engineers,  
9 in coordination with the U.S. Navy and Army Corps of Engineers, are constructing facilities to  
10 support one task force plus trainers and sustainers at both Mihail Kogalniceanu (M-K) Air Base,  
11 Romania and Novo Selo Training Area, Bulgaria. Permanent Forward Operating Sites and other  
12 training facilities in Romania and Bulgaria have projected completion dates of 2009 and 2011,  
13 respectively. In the interim, USAREUR is conducting summer rotations with Army National  
14 Guard, select USAREUR formations, and host nation forces at temporary FOS locations. In  
15 summation, USAREUR is an invaluable asset to EUCOM as we advance our SAS across Europe  
16 and Eurasia in an uncertain future.

#### 17 **United States Naval Forces Europe (NAVEUR)**

18           NAVEUR continues to build and maintain naval leadership and combat readiness to  
19 counter any adversary. NAVEUR's assigned fleet, U.S. SIXTH Fleet, demonstrated their  
20 operational capabilities through actual Joint Task Force (JTF) and Joint Force Maritime  
21 Component Commander (JFMCC) operations during FY08 in support of maritime interdiction  
22 operations, JTF LEBANON planning, and Operation ASSURED DELIVERY humanitarian

1 assistance support to Georgia. In FY09 SIXTH Fleet will re-certify as a JFMCC Head Quarters  
2 for full-spectrum operations during exercise AUSTERE CHALLENGE 09.

3       NAVEUR's forward presence not only strengthens relationships with enduring Allies and  
4 emerging partners, it also develops maritime capabilities throughout the region, contributing to  
5 regional stability and enabling them to support operations out of their local areas. One of  
6 NAVEUR's primary objectives is building maritime partnerships. Over the past year, NAVEUR  
7 has focused increasingly on international efforts primarily in the Black Sea-Eurasia region.  
8 NAVEUR is using its maritime expertise to support and encourage prosperity and development  
9 ashore by improving regional Maritime Safety and Security (MSS). NAVEUR addresses  
10 Maritime Safety and Security within partner nations by assisting partner nations in developing an  
11 organic capacity to observe, evaluate, and respond in their maritime domain. At the same time  
12 these improvements contribute to a global maritime awareness picture focused on improving  
13 Maritime Safety and Security around the world.

14       Maritime Domain Awareness provides participating nations the capability to network  
15 maritime detection and identification information with appropriate national defense and law  
16 enforcement agencies. Transparency and partnership are vital to its success. The first step to  
17 achieve Maritime Domain Awareness is the Automatic Identification System (AIS). AIS is a  
18 transponder system that reports ship position and other information similar to the system in use  
19 globally for air traffic control. Through NAVEUR initiatives, 23 nations in Europe now share  
20 unclassified AIS data through the Maritime Safety and Security Information System (MSSIS).

21       Nations differ in how they organize and assign responsibility for maritime issues to  
22 governmental agencies and organizations. NAVEUR continues to expand engagement of  
23 maritime professionals from beyond the host nation's traditional navy to include Coast Guard,

1 Gendarmerie, Customs, Harbor and Ports Authorities, Hospitals, Police, Fire, and Fisheries  
2 departments. These engagements have served to focus efforts on those responsible and most  
3 capable to improve Maritime Safety and Security. Additionally, NAVEUR uses the U.S. Navy's  
4 Total Force Concept employing its Reserve Component throughout the NAVEUR staff and to  
5 supplement manpower and expertise in embassy country teams. Reservists are deployed as  
6 Maritime Assistance Officers to assist in planning and executing maritime activities, enabling  
7 and enhancing execution of security cooperation.

8 NAVEUR played a significant role in enhancing maritime safety, security, and  
9 cooperation in the EUCOM AOR in FY08. Some examples of our engagement activities during  
10 FY08 include:

11 The Black Sea Partnership Cruise 2008 (BSPC08), the second installment of a U.S.-led  
12 initiative to improve NATO interoperability, build Maritime Domain Awareness, and enhance  
13 theater security cooperation among Black Sea nations, was conducted onboard USS MOUNT  
14 WHITNEY at sea with maritime professionals from five Black Sea area nations (Azerbaijan,  
15 Bulgaria, Georgia, Romania, and Ukraine) and NATO observers from four nations (Estonia,  
16 Greece, Lithuania, and Poland). Major topics taught or demonstrated during the cruise include  
17 NCO development, Shipboard Helicopter Operations, Law of the Sea, Oil Spill Response and  
18 Consequence Management exercises, and a robust Visit Board Search and Seizure  
19 (VBSS)/Customs Enforcement workshop. Aside from the academic benefits, the BSPC serves to  
20 foster an open and collaborative environment among Black Sea nations and to build long term  
21 relationships between junior officers that would not otherwise develop.

22 NAVEUR and SIXTH Fleet commands and units along with several European and North  
23 African navies (France, Italy, Malta, Mauritania, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia, and

1 Turkey), conducted a multilateral naval exercise called PHOENIX EXPRESS 2008. This  
2 exercise has grown in size and complexity over the last three years and it continues to be a great  
3 success in building partner capacity and developing relations, focusing on maritime interdiction,  
4 communications, and information sharing. The desire is to expand PHOENIX EXPRESS 2009  
5 to include navies from Algeria, France, Greece, Italy, Malta, Morocco, Portugal, Spain, Tunisia,  
6 Turkey, Senegal, and possibly others.

7 The 36th annual Baltic Operations Exercise 2008 (BALTOPS 08) with 13 participating  
8 nations, (Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Netherlands, Poland,  
9 Sweden, Russia, United Kingdom, and the United States) was a EUCOM-directed, NAVEUR-  
10 sponsored, and U.S. SIXTH Fleet-executed multinational exercise conducted in the spirit of  
11 Partnership for Peace (PfP). This exercise tested U.S. and our key maritime partners' abilities to  
12 operate and protect Europe's sea lines of communication against highly capable submarine  
13 threats.

14 In response to the increasing ballistic missile threat to this AOR, NAVEUR is leading an  
15 urgent effort to develop the requirement for ballistic missile defense (BMD) command and  
16 control capability both ashore and afloat. NAVEUR, in collaboration with NAVCENT, war  
17 gamed scenarios to develop a command and control architecture for a BMD capable Aegis ship  
18 operating in defense of Eastern Mediterranean nations.

19 Naval Mobile Construction Battalion Four (NMCB-4) deployed a 25 person detachment  
20 to Romania (Mihail Kogalniceanu Air Base, Constanta) and Bulgaria (Novo Seio Training Area,  
21 Silven) in FY08. The CB Detachment conducted HCA in Romania and exercise related  
22 construction (ERC) in Bulgaria in support of the JTF-E Commander's forward basing initiative.

1 Explosive Ordnance Disposal Mobile Unit Eight (EODMU-8), a forward deployed  
2 NAVEUR EOD command consisting of 170 personnel, supported a total of seven combat  
3 deployments in 2008 to OIF and OEF.

4 NAVEUR and Navy Region Europe continue to exercise and refine the Task Force  
5 Consequence Management (CM) structure to respond to “all-hazard” CM events in the EUCOM  
6 AOR. In FY08, NAVEUR and Navy Region Europe conducted a Pandemic Influenza Table Top  
7 Exercise with the Italian Government. Over 100 participants met at the Lazzaro Spallanzani  
8 National Institute for Infectious Disease in Rome in order to clarify the authorities,  
9 responsibilities, and roles of participating agencies in an integrated, comprehensive response to  
10 pandemic influenza.

11 The infrastructure at NAVEUR bases sustains the combat readiness of permanent,  
12 rotational and surge naval forces, as well as that of other Service Component forces. NAVEUR  
13 transformation, in support of the Integrated Global Presence and Basing Strategy, has reshaped  
14 the U.S. Navy’s footprint in Europe to support operations south and east into Africa and Eastern  
15 Europe. NAVEUR’s transformation efforts over the past five years have closed NAS Keflavik,  
16 Iceland, U.S. Naval Activities, United Kingdom, and Naval Support Activity La Maddalena,  
17 Italy. Joint Maritime Facility St. Mawgan, United Kingdom is proposed to close in FY09 while  
18 the port of Gaeta, Italy will realign under NSA Naples. This will leave Naval Forces Europe  
19 with four enduring bases. The enduring bases at Rota, Spain; Sigonella, Italy; and Souda Bay,  
20 Greece are strategically located across the Mediterranean to provide flexible and highly capable  
21 inter- and intra-theater logistic support. The base at NSA Naples, Italy provides a consolidated  
22 command and control location for Headquarters, NAVEUR and SIXTH Fleet in close proximity

1 to the NATO operational Headquarters of Allied Joint Forces Command Naples and Striking and  
2 Support Forces NATO.

3 From a basing and infrastructure perspective, the base closure phase of NAVEUR  
4 transformation is substantially complete. NAVEUR is shifting the focus of its transformation  
5 efforts ashore to developing a Joint framework that enables alignment between Navy  
6 infrastructure and validated Combatant Commander requirements. Navy Installations are  
7 increasingly critical to supporting current and proposed future operations of the Geographic and  
8 Functional Combatant Commanders. Existing processes and procedures do not provide adequate  
9 and timely visibility of COCOM, NATO, and other U.S. Agency requirements. In order to  
10 integrate COCOM/NATO/USG Agency requirements into the Service resourcing processes,  
11 NAVEUR is participating in the development of Theater Asset Management for application at  
12 key Navy Installations with joint value such as NAVSTA Rota, NAS Sigonella and NSA Souda  
13 Bay. The three key components of Theater Asset Management (joint manning, joint processes  
14 and governance, joint standards and criteria) are critical to NAVEUR's effort to advance the art  
15 and science of transformation beyond its Service-specific origins and realize a cross-Service,  
16 cross-COCOM, cross-agency linkage between capability, capacity, infrastructure and  
17 requirements.

### 18 **United States Air Forces Europe (USAFE)**

19 USAFE is a key force provider in the form of tactical combat air forces, tanker, and airlift  
20 assets for EUCOM, OIF, ISAF, and OEF. In 2008, USAFE units flew over 26,000 combat-  
21 fighter hours, nearly 4,000 tanker/transport hours, and trained 18 NATO Joint Terminal Air  
22 Controllers (JTAC) from 7 countries supporting peacekeeping operations in Kosovo, OIF, ISAF,  
23 and OEF. USAFE has deployed six of its eight fighter squadrons, 100 percent of its heavy airlift

1 and tanker squadrons, and a large percentage of its Airmen in support of global operations. To  
2 plan and execute EUCOM's quick-strike capability, USAFE operates a fully functional Falconer  
3 Air Operations Center (AOC). In addition, USAFE's deployed Control and Reporting Centers  
4 support OEF, ISAF and OIF with persistent round-the-clock wide-area surveillance, common  
5 tactical picture fusion and distribution, and tactical air battle management and control capability  
6 from Kandahar AB, Afghanistan and Al Udeid AB, Qatar.

7 Direct support of current multinational operations is provided by nearly all USAFE bases  
8 and units. USAFE main bases and Geographically Separated Units (GSUs) throughout the  
9 EUCOM AOR enable Global Attack, Global Mobility, CORONET (movement of air assets,  
10 primarily fighter aircraft), Air Bridge, Force Extension and Theater Support air refueling  
11 missions. USAFE air mobility hubs at Incirlik AB in Turkey, Ramstein and Spangdahlem Air  
12 Bases in Germany, Moron AB in Spain, and RAF Mildenhall in the U.K. enable crucial logistical  
13 support of U.S., Allied, and coalition forces fighting in the CENTCOM AOR. Meanwhile, Lajes  
14 AB in the Azores (Portugal) provides vital throughput for combat and mobility air forces alike.  
15 USAFE also directly supports our wounded Airmen and brothers and sisters in arms. USAFE's  
16 435th Contingency Aeromedical Staging Facility at Ramstein processed 12,787 patient  
17 movements – as many as 94 in a single day – during the past year. USAFE's 86<sup>th</sup> Aeromedical  
18 Evacuation Squadron is directly involved in providing airborne medical support for many of  
19 these patients from Iraq to Ramstein AB and on to CONUS-based medical facilities. Sick and  
20 wounded patients received at Ramstein AB are treated at Landstuhl Regional Medical Center  
21 (LRMC). LRMC, a jointly staffed Medical Treatment Facility (MTF) with permanently assigned  
22 Army and Air Force medical staffs and considerable deployed augmentation from the Navy and  
23 Air Force, is the largest MTF in the world for contingency support medicine and the only

1 Secretary of Defense designated Level 3 MTF in support of OEF and OIF. Once stabilized,  
2 LRMC patients are sent on to the U.S. for additional care.

3 In addition to fully supporting ongoing combat operations, USAFE, as the air component  
4 to EUCOM, provides full-spectrum air, space, and cyberspace capabilities and options. USAFE  
5 promotes regional stability through focused theater engagement and supports combat operations,  
6 humanitarian assistance, and Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD). USAFE is also EUCOM's lead  
7 agent for personnel recovery, theater air mobility and aeromedical evacuation. As the designated  
8 Area Air Defense Commander (AADC) for EUCOM, USAFE took an initial step to deliver  
9 integrated ballistic missile defense by installing a Command, Control, Battle Management, &  
10 Communication (C2BMC) suite in its 3rd AF Air Operations Center. C2BMC provides the  
11 commander with BMD situational awareness and the capability to rapidly identify and track  
12 ballistic missile threats for early warning and possible defensive counter-measures. In an effort  
13 to ensure overall mission success as EUCOM's Air Component, USAFE annually revalidates its  
14 full spectrum capability during Joint Exercises like AUSTERE CHALLENGE.

15 USAFE also plays a vital role in EUCOM's Strategy of Active Security (SAS) and  
16 Theater Campaign Plan. In support of the SAS and theater engagement, USAFE participated in  
17 over 450 TSC events in 44 countries. This includes USAFE support to events such as  
18 MEDCEUR 2008, a multinational medical training exercise in Croatia. This "In the Spirit of"  
19 Partnership for Peace (PfP) JCS-sponsored regional, multinational exercise in Central and  
20 Eastern Europe, integrated the Air National Guard (ANG), Air Force Reserve Command (AFRC)  
21 and 320 participants from 14 different countries in crisis response, humanitarian assistance,  
22 disaster relief, and foreign consequence management operations. MEDCEUR 2008 culminated

1 in a one week mass casualty training exercise to challenge and test first responders, triage and  
2 stabilization procedures, and medical evacuation.

3 USAFE's operational theater engagement highlights include support to NATO and  
4 Mobility Operations. USAFE provided continuous Combat Air Patrols in the skies over  
5 Bucharest, Romania during the NATO Summit. This effort included fighter, mobility and  
6 support forces from five separate USAFE Wings. In support of the NATO Baltic Air Policing  
7 mission, USAFE deployed four F-15Cs to Lithuania for three months. These fighters maintained  
8 a constant 24-hour alert, ever-ready to intercept aircraft which might violate the air sovereignty  
9 of Estonia, Latvia or Lithuania. Additionally, USAFE executed the largest air exercise since the  
10 fall of communism in the Baltic region. American fighter and tanker aircraft, joined by Polish  
11 and Danish air forces and guided by Baltic weapons controllers, participated in an exercise that  
12 clearly demonstrated NATO alert force capability as well as a commitment to the defense of  
13 Allies. Finally, at the first call for Georgian Humanitarian Assistance, USAFE airlifters flew  
14 over 220 tons of cargo and 164 passengers in 115 sorties logging over 460 flight hours.

15 A vital component of USAFE's presence in theater is cooperation and interaction with  
16 our NATO Allies. USAFE conducted 19 JCS exercises in 16 different countries. NORTHERN  
17 VIKING 08, conducted in Keflavik, Iceland, provided training and experience in joint and  
18 combined air defense, sea surveillance, public relations, and counter-terrorism for U.S. and  
19 NATO forces and successfully demonstrated continued support to U.S. treaty commitments to  
20 Iceland.

21 USAFE is collaborating with 12 other nations to achieve a Strategic Airlift Capability  
22 (SAC) based in the European Theater. The SAC will provide dedicated and timely access to  
23 global C-17 airlift to each of 12 participating nations: 10 NATO Allies, including the U.S., plus

1 Sweden and Finland. This consortium is implementing a multinational military Heavy Airlift  
2 Wing (HAW) at Papa Air Base, Hungary. The HAW will be comprised of military members  
3 from each of the 12 participating nations and will operate 3 C-17 aircraft. The C-17s will  
4 support NATO, EU, UN, and sovereign operations. Of the approximate 151 HAW personnel, 41  
5 will be U.S. Air Force members. The HAW Commander is expected to declare Initial  
6 Operational Capability (IOC) later in 2009 when the unit is ready to assume its full range of  
7 missions with its first C-17 aircraft.

8 To further interoperability and extend capacity of limited U.S. Intelligence, Surveillance,  
9 and Reconnaissance (ISR) assets, USAFE continues to explore expansion of its traditional  
10 intelligence exchanges, while investigating new opportunities with partner nations. USAFE  
11 aggressively pursues the opportunity to work with partner nations which now possess, or are  
12 developing, airborne ISR capabilities. Robust coalition operations can be realized by building on  
13 these relationships and standardizing tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs).

14 In addition, USAFE and partner nations are simultaneously pursuing methods to integrate  
15 ISR architectures and leverage coalition assets to satisfy mutual requirements. For example,  
16 USAFE is engaged in an intelligence initiative with the U.K. to develop a shared/integrated net-  
17 centric ISR capability to support coalition partners. These actions have provided much-needed  
18 manpower relief and additional insight into complex problem sets for both USAFE and  
19 CENTCOM. Moreover, USAFE's Distributed Ground Station (DGS-4) began SIGINT Mission  
20 Management last fall and obtained a multiple-intelligence methods collection capability,  
21 improving accuracy and timeliness of actionable intelligence for theater warfighters. This was a  
22 combined operations engagement entailing 24-hour operations in support of the NATO Summit  
23 in Bucharest.

1           USAFE, as a service Major Command, provides Administrative Control (ADCON) of  
2   Seventeenth Air Force (17 AF), the Air Force Component assigned to AFRICOM. 17 AF  
3   (AFAFRICA) was stood up with IOC on 1 Oct 08 and plans to meet FOC by 1 Oct 09. During  
4   this build-up period, USAFE's 3 AF Air Operations Center (AOC) has supported 17 AF with air,  
5   space, and cyberspace capability as necessary to carry out AFRICOM mission requirements.

6           Looking toward the future, USAFE will recapitalize the vast majority of its aircraft with  
7   next generation variants. Starting in March 2009, sixteen Vietnam-era C-130E models will be  
8   replaced by C-130J models that provide both increased range and payload capability. Next will  
9   be the replacement of the U-2 with the RQ-4 Global Hawk at NAS Sigonella, as approved by the  
10   Italian government last April. Beddown of the Global Hawk support assets will be complete by  
11   December of this year with the first aircraft scheduled to arrive in the second quarter of 2010.  
12   Five F-35 squadrons will be replacing our air-to-ground fighters over the next 13 years. USAFE  
13   is working aggressively to accelerate delivery of the F-35 to the EUCOM theater to be  
14   concurrent with our F-35 NATO program participants Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway,  
15   Turkey, and the U.K.. This earlier delivery will allow USAFE to lead NATO, encourage  
16   transformation, deter future threats, and leverage coalition basing, tactics and training. In  
17   addition, starting in 2015, the current Combat Search and Rescue (CSAR) squadron is planned to  
18   begin to grow into a full CSAR Group to include a robust CSAR-X squadron, HC-130s, and  
19   Guardian Angel Weapon System (GAWS). This forward deployed Group will provide  
20   expeditionary CSAR support, to meet EUCOM and other COCOM demands. These assets will  
21   also be used to continue to develop an internal NATO capacity for out-of-area CSAR operations.

22   **United States Marine Forces, Europe (MARFOREUR)**

1 MARFOREUR continues to conduct operations, exercises, training, and security  
2 cooperation activities in the region through the employment of a small staff of both active duty  
3 and RC Marines. MARFOREUR optimizes the smallest commitment of forces or senior level  
4 visits by focusing them in priority areas. MARFOREUR also assisted in Marine Forces Africa's  
5 (MARFORAF) standup as a Service Component of AFRICOM and continues to provide  
6 consolidated administrative headquarters functions.

7 The majority of MARFOREUR's activities were focused on the Black Sea-Caucasus and  
8 West Africa-Gulf of Guinea regions. MARFOREUR participated in 11 exercises and 45  
9 separate mil-to-mil events throughout Europe and Africa. Eleven DoS-sponsored African  
10 Contingency Operations Training Assistance (ACOTA) events were conducted prior to the  
11 standup of AFRICOM that resulted in the training of six separate African nations in preparation  
12 for United Nations or African Union peacekeeping missions.

13 U.S. Marine Corps prepositioned equipment plays an important role in supporting  
14 EUCOM's contingency plans and its Strategy of Active Security. MARFOREUR seeks to  
15 enhance its ability to rapidly deploy forces into the AOR by conducting maritime prepositioning  
16 force (MPF) exercises and utilizing equipment stored in Marine Corps Prepositioning Program –  
17 Norway (MCPN) in support of exercises and operations whenever possible. During the  
18 conduct of humanitarian assistance operations in Georgia, equipment supplied from MCPN  
19 contributed to the overall relief effort.

20 The High Speed Vessel (HSV) is an asset that enables more frequent, focused  
21 engagement activities with coalition and emerging partners across the EUCOM AOR. The vessel  
22 provides persistent "soft presence," and enhances our strategic lift capability by bridging the gap  
23 between low speed sea lift and high speed air lift, and enabling a broad spectrum of missions.

1 The Joint High Speed Vessel (JHSV) is a key piece of the SEABASING architecture. It will  
2 enable rapid closure of Marines to the sea base from forward-deployed advanced land bases,  
3 logistics movement from MPF ships to amphibious ships, ship-to-ship replenishment, and, in  
4 appropriate threat environments, maneuver of assault forces to in-theater austere ports.

5 In 2008, MARFOREUR and NAVEUR conducted the inaugural Africa Partnership  
6 Station (APS) deployment aboard the USS FORT MCHENRY, thus initiating a new era of naval  
7 BPC operations in the AOR. In March, the West Africa Training Cruise (WATC) 08  
8 demonstrated current SEABASING capabilities utilizing existing platforms and equipment.  
9 CTF-365 had four ships under tactical control, the USS FORT MCHENRY, the High Speed  
10 Vessel (HSV-2) SWIFT, and two maritime prepositioning squadron ships, the USNS BOBO and  
11 USNS WHEAT. The Naval force aggregated the sea base off the coast of Liberia from different  
12 origins and assembled maritime prepositioned equipment via tactical connectors. Once  
13 assembled, the task force was employed ashore via HSV to support a humanitarian effort,  
14 delivering supplies to clinics, hospitals, and schools. Upon conclusion, the task force  
15 reconstituted aboard the sea base and all vessels redeployed to conduct their separate follow-on  
16 missions.

17 In Europe, prior to the recent conflict in Georgia, MARFOREUR coordinated a  
18 HMMWV driver training program that contributed to the sustained rotation of a Georgian  
19 brigade through OIF. MARFOREUR will continue to seek similar engagement opportunities in  
20 this strategically important region and will capitalize on ODC initiatives and partner nation  
21 interest in the full range of Marine Corps capabilities such as NCO development, maintenance  
22 management, intelligence capacity building, and communications support.

1 MARFOREUR support to the Joint Exercise Program relies largely on the Marine Corps  
2 Reserve, offering unique annual training opportunities to U.S.-based forces while mitigating the  
3 impact of limited active duty force availability. Additionally, MARFOREUR conducts exercises  
4 in the region involving Marine units up to the battalion/squadron-size level, again utilizing the  
5 RC as the primary force provider. These exercises will increasingly integrate MPF and  
6 prepositioned equipment in support of the developing joint SEABASING concept as well as  
7 enhancing Marine Corps expeditionary warfare capabilities.

8 As the executive agent within DoD for non-lethal weapons (NLW), the Marine Corps,  
9 through MARFOREUR, conducted NLW education and training programs involving both  
10 existing and emerging partners. This year, by integrating NLW weapons training into JTF-E  
11 rotations, MARFOREUR conducted NLW training with over 500 military personnel from  
12 Romania and Bulgaria. Current equipment sets facilitate a basic NLW capability, however the  
13 next generation of NLW will utilize cutting-edge directed energy technologies to provide Marine  
14 units as well as joint and combined forces the option of selectively escalating levels of force with  
15 reversible effects, thus giving commanders more time to make decisions in uncertain  
16 environments and avoid undesirable effects.

#### 17 **United States Special Operations Command, Europe (SOCEUR)**

18 SOCEUR efforts at countering terrorism in 2008 focused on expanding European SOF  
19 partnerships and capacity through the Partner Development Plan and by improving the counter-  
20 terrorism capability of North African partner nations through OEF-TS. In his role as director of  
21 the NATO Special Operations Coordination Center (NSCC), COMSOCEUR directed the  
22 development of common Terms of Reference as well as standardized doctrine and training for  
23 NATO Special Operations to enhance SOF integration and interoperability within the Alliance.

1 Finally, following the stand-up of AFRICOM in October 08, SOCEUR implemented a transition  
2 team to support the establishment of SOCAFRICA as a sub-unified command. SOCEUR then  
3 undertook a comprehensive evaluation that redefined its roles and missions to focus on the  
4 dynamic European security environment, upon completion of transfer of responsibilities of OEF-  
5 TS to AFRICOM.

6 SOCEUR's operations in the Trans-Sahara region gained momentum and made increased  
7 progress towards building a capable counter-terrorism capacity to enable governments to conduct  
8 operations against violent extremists operating within their borders. Partner enthusiasm and  
9 support for this capacity building was evident during JCS Exercise SILENT WARRIOR in May  
10 2008, when nine African and three European partner nations executed a combined counter-  
11 terrorism exercise across an area larger than the entire continental United States. In September  
12 2008 fifteen partner nations contributed a total of 567 personnel to JCS Exercise FLINTLOCK  
13 2008 in a combined counter-terrorism exercise in four African and one European nation. These  
14 highly successful exercises forged relationships and developed a common understanding among  
15 participants about how to proceed against an insidious and mutual threat to regional security.

16 SOCEUR conducted 29 Joint Combined Exchange Training (JCET) events and 13  
17 Bilateral Training Events in 27 countries during 2008. These events have continued to develop  
18 our European and OEF-TS partner nations into more capable, professional Special Operations  
19 Forces, with the added benefit of increased political support and commitment from their political  
20 leadership.

21 When OEF-TS transfers to SOCAFRICA, SOCEUR will increasingly shift its focus  
22 towards building partner SOF capacity in Europe along three lines of development: continuing  
23 support for the NATO SOF Transformation Initiative; expanding SOCEUR-led, bilateral Partner

1 Development Plan activities; and sustaining 1-10 SFG component deployments to ISAF. These  
2 initiatives directly support EUCOM's objective to enhance partner and Allied SOF capability  
3 and generate increased SOF capacity for deployment to NATO missions and other expeditionary  
4 operations.

5 Beginning with just a handful of loaned U.S. personnel, the NSCC became a true  
6 coalition organization by the end of 2007, reaching IOC with voluntary national contributions of  
7 81 personnel from France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the U.K., and the U.S. There are currently 23  
8 nations represented in the NSCC, the largest standing coalition of SOF in the world. The NSCC,  
9 as the NATO SOF proponent, continues to generate increased desire and willingness on the part  
10 of Alliance and partner nations to contribute additional SOF to NATO operations in Afghanistan.

11 SOCEUR conducted JCS Exercise JACKAL STONE 08 to continue partner development  
12 in support of EUCOM Strategy of Active Security, to conduct CJSOTF training for forces  
13 deploying to Afghanistan, to enhance partner special operations training, and to exercise in the  
14 unique training environment offered by participating nations. Approximately 1,420 personnel  
15 from eight European nations participated in this month-long exercise.

16 *The SOCEUR Partner Development Plan (PDP)* remains the catalyst to allow our  
17 European partners to take a more proactive role in global defense efforts where our national  
18 interests intersect, and in the future this may lead to strategic relief for deployed U.S. SOF. PDP  
19 has recently been designated a Program of Record. As a direct result of the SOCEUR Partner  
20 Development Plan and NSCC initiatives, NATO SOF contributions to ISAF increased the  
21 number of deployed NATO Special Operations Task Groups to ISAF from two in 2007 to eight  
22 by the end of 2008--representing a 400% increase in NATO SOF combat power.



1 Both EUCOM and component activities require infrastructure for fixed facilities,  
2 mobility, prepositioning of equipment, and interoperability. EUCOM's ability to continue its  
3 transformation and recapitalization in Europe will depend in large measure on the investment  
4 provided for military construction (MILCON), Strategic Mobility and Maneuver programs,  
5 Quality of Life programs, Theater Command, Control and Communications Systems, ISR, and  
6 Pre-positioned Equipment.

### 7 **Theater Infrastructure**

8 EUCOM advocates MILCON investment in enduring installations that support EUCOM  
9 transformation. While we resist investing MILCON in non-enduring installations, we must  
10 continue to use sustainment, restoration and modernization (SRM) funds and other resources to  
11 maintain these installations until all the Soldiers, Airmen, Sailors, civilian employees and their  
12 families depart and the installations are removed from the inventory.

13 Previous annual MILCON authorizations and appropriations have enabled EUCOM to  
14 modernize infrastructure, basing and housing facilities. These authorizations and appropriations  
15 have supported our theater strategy by providing enduring infrastructure from which to operate.  
16 As these were discussed in detail in the 2008 EUCOM posture hearings, they will not be  
17 recapitulated here.

18 We must anticipate infrastructure requests beyond FY09 for our future force structure.  
19 These investments will enable us to eliminate substandard housing and includes projects that will  
20 pay dividends as we divest non-enduring bases and consolidate our forces into more efficient  
21 communities.

1 EUCOM's future requirements will form the basis for our Strategic Theater  
2 Transformation and Military Construction requests. For FY10, these will be available after the  
3 Administration finalizes the FY10 budget submission.

#### 4 **NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP)**

5 The NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) reduces the need for MILCON and  
6 SRM money to fund many of EUCOM's operational infrastructure requirements. Through  
7 EUCOM's continuous and collaborative dialogue with NATO and host nation military staffs, the  
8 Command has successfully planned, programmed and benefitted from over \$640 million in NSIP  
9 investment since 2004. This investment has increased operational capabilities at nearly all of  
10 EUCOM's Main Operating Bases and Forward Operating Sites on projects ranging from harbor  
11 dredging and hydrant fuel systems, to aircraft parking and maintenance facilities. NATO  
12 identifies infrastructure requirements through Capability Packages, which are statements of  
13 military capabilities required to meet NATO military requirements. Our involvement in  
14 emerging Capability Packages will likely include funding for projects to enhance operational  
15 capabilities for strategic air transport, air-to-air refueling and theater-wide fuel distribution and  
16 storage.

#### 17 **STRATEGIC MOBILITY AND MANEUVER**

18 Because facilities and forces must be effectively linked, sea lift, strategic and tactical  
19 airlift, and ground transportation systems are essential elements of EUCOM's Strategy of Active  
20 Security. Meeting the objectives of this strategy, particularly robust BPC activities, requires  
21 dependable and available transport. Further, we envision increased lift requirements to support  
22 the increased engagement in Africa facilitated by AFRICOM whose organic lift capability is  
23 severely limited. Equally important, our ability to respond rapidly to crises depends on readily

1 available strategic lift platforms capable of covering the vast expanse of our AOR--the distance  
2 between Central Europe and Sub-Saharan Africa is equivalent to that between Europe and  
3 California. EUCOM's current fleet of C-130s, which cannot carry out-sized cargo, lack the  
4 range or capacity to support the rapid movement of forces or humanitarian assistance throughout  
5 the theater. To this end, EUCOM will continue to pursue increased organic tactical and strategic  
6 lift capability to enable the full range of engagement and contingency activities. We appreciate  
7 the support in the FY08 NDAA for the Strategic Airlift Capability and look forward to the  
8 successful implementation of the SAC program and its associated Memorandum of  
9 Understanding.

10 The mobility infrastructure within Europe and Africa continues to be an integral part of  
11 the national strategic mobility effort. In recent years, EUCOM has inherited significantly  
12 increased responsibilities in, and through, our theater directly supporting current global  
13 operations. EUCOM is meeting that challenge, and simultaneously fulfilling our existing  
14 mission requirements of training and engagement with Allies and partners, through key programs  
15 of support.

16 In the near term, EUCOM is actively addressing emerging requirements to the south and  
17 east, including en-route expansion possibilities and locations, new air and sea port uses, and  
18 continued support to AFRICOM and CENTCOM AORs. From FY06 to FY09 EUCOM  
19 successfully planned and executed \$81M in MILCON for four EUCOM en-route infrastructure  
20 projects. During this same time frame, EUCOM's enroute locations benefited from over \$65M  
21 in NATO Security Investment Program (NSIP) funding, off-setting additional MILCON costs.

22 Future EUCOM enroute infrastructure requirements will continue to be shaped by  
23 emerging global access demands from changes in the long-term EUCOM force posture, seam

1 regions such as the Caucuses and Central Asia, trans-regional mobility support to CENTCOM,  
2 continued support to AFRICOM, and NATO/ISAF operations.

### 3 **Pre-positioned Equipment**

4 Pre-positioned equipment reduces demands on the transportation system and appreciably  
5 shortens its response time. Continued support of the Services' Pre-positioned War Reserve  
6 Materiel (PWRM) programs also demonstrates commitment through presence and preserves a  
7 broad spectrum of traditional crisis response and irregular warfare options globally. As we  
8 transform and transition to a more expeditionary posture, there is a heightened need for PWRM  
9 equipment sets configured to support both kinetic and non-kinetic operations, positioned in  
10 strategically flexible locations. Transformation of prepositioning to support has taken on new  
11 urgency in light of the U.S. actions in Operation ASSURED DELIVERY.

12 All four Services maintain PWRM in EUCOM's AOR, either on land or afloat. USAFE  
13 continues to maintain PWRM at main operating bases within the theater, with centrally managed  
14 storage sites in Norway and Luxembourg. Equipment includes Basic Expeditionary Airfield  
15 Resources (BEAR) kits postured for global use, as well as multiple classes of flight line support  
16 equipment for exercises, maneuvers, and operations in the EUCOM AOR. USAFE also  
17 maintains a stock of pre-positioned equipment in the U.K. for support of Global Strike Command  
18 bomber beddown.

19 Many stocks have been drawn down to support ISAF, OEF, and OIF and will not be reset  
20 until at least 2015. Over two-thirds of the Marine Corps Pre-positioning Program-Norway  
21 (MCPN) stocks were withdrawn in direct support of OIF and OEF. Equipment was also drawn  
22 out of the EUCOM Maritime Pre-positioned Force (MPF) program to outfit additional combat  
23 units in support of the Marine Corps expansion. The Department of the Army's Heavy Brigade

1 Combat Team (HBCT) pre-positioned set from Camp Darby near Livorno, Italy is being used to  
2 support operations in Iraq and Afghanistan as well.

3 Continued Service investment in this capability is necessary to ensure that a fully flexible  
4 range of military operations remains available to Combatant Commanders. EUCOM is actively  
5 involved in DoD-led studies examining the global disposition of PWRM and is working to  
6 ensure our strategic direction and operational requirements are incorporated in these studies and  
7 ultimately in an overarching DoD prepositioning strategy, beyond traditional “war reserve.”

## 8 **INTEROPERABILITY AND LOGISTICS**

### 9 **Partner and Coalition Interoperability**

10 Interoperability enables us to build effective coalitions and improves the logistics of even  
11 single-nation operations.

12 COMBINED ENDEAVOR (CE) is the largest and most powerful Security Cooperation,  
13 Communications, and Information Systems exercise in the world. It is sponsored by EUCOM  
14 and brings NATO, PfP members, and other nations together to plan and execute interoperability  
15 scenarios with national systems in preparation for future combined humanitarian, peacekeeping,  
16 and disaster relief operations. Further, results are published in the CE Interoperability Guide,  
17 enabling multinational communicators to rapidly establish command and control systems for the  
18 force commander. The rapid integration of past participants into the UN Mission in Lebanon,  
19 tsunami relief, ISAF deployments and multinational divisions in OIF were salient examples of  
20 COMBINED ENDEAVOR’S effectiveness. CE ‘08 emphasized network security, multinational  
21 common operational picture, friendly force tracking, as well as information sharing and  
22 collaboration with NGOs. CE ‘08 provided communications support to Exercise MEDCEUR,  
23 affording CE participants a venue to address TTPs in an operational environment.

1           The Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstration (CWID) is an annual event that  
2 enables the COCOMs and the international community to investigate command, control,  
3 communications, computer, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) solutions that  
4 focus on relevant and timely objectives for enhancing coalition interoperability. CWID  
5 investigates information technologies that will integrate into an operational environment within  
6 the near term. CWID is also a venue for information technology development or validation of  
7 fielded or near-fielded commercial, DoD, and partner systems to reduce fielding costs or  
8 programmed transition timelines.

9           As has been described above, EUCOM has significant competencies, relationships, and  
10 resources to draw upon in order to promote security and stability throughout the region. One of  
11 the primary ways that we mitigate the risk to our own security is through building strong  
12 relationships with our partner nations. Our Security Cooperation programs form a foundation for  
13 shared and interoperable capabilities to respond to contingencies.

14 ***Reform of the Security Cooperation Framework*** is crucial to the achievement of national  
15 strategic objectives in the EUCOM AOR, including those related to supporting coalition  
16 operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, dealing with Russia and its actions in Georgia, maintaining  
17 U.S. leadership in NATO, and strengthening the Alliance.

18           As the Secretary of Defense has stated, the “U.S. strategy is to employ indirect  
19 approaches – primarily through building the capacity of partner governments – to prevent  
20 festering problems from turning into crises that require costly and controversial direct military  
21 intervention.” In Europe, this strategy not only helps nations provide for their own security and  
22 maintain stability within the region, but also enables many Allies and partners to *export* security  
23 to other regions, most notably as contributors to coalition operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

1 Both directly and indirectly, our BPC efforts reduce the burden on U.S. military forces and  
2 advance U.S. strategic interests.

3 Our BPC efforts encompass a wide range of activities, including training individual units,  
4 modernizing and transforming military forces, educating current and future military leaders, and  
5 developing the defense institutions of Allies and partners. They require a Security Cooperation  
6 Framework that enables strategic planning and application of resources to achieve national  
7 objectives. They also require a whole-of-government approach supported by robust military *and*  
8 civilian capacity. However, existing Security Cooperation authorities, procedures, resources,  
9 and interagency coordination mechanisms do not adequately support a strategy based on building  
10 partner capacity. Limited resources and the proliferation of multiple, complex, restrictive  
11 authorities and processes, each with their own set of rules and management procedures,  
12 significantly constrain our ability to plan, make commitments to Allies and partners, respond to  
13 strategic events, and execute operations and activities to achieve U.S. strategic objectives in  
14 Europe. Furthermore, the lack of interagency unity of effort undermines our ability to capitalize  
15 on opportunities to achieve national security objectives in the EUCOM AOR.

16 Recent initiatives, such as Section 1206 of the 2006 NDAA, Building Capacity of  
17 Foreign Military Forces, have partially mitigated some of these shortcomings. These and other  
18 measures are important first steps toward the more comprehensive reform of the Security  
19 Assistance Framework that is required to execute the strategy outlined by Secretary Gates. Such  
20 reform should streamline existing Title 10 and 22 authorities, facilitate strategic planning and  
21 application of resources, increase responsiveness and effectiveness in meeting emerging  
22 requirements, enhance interagency coordination to permit whole-of-government approaches, and  
23 -- as the Secretary of Defense has proposed elsewhere -- increase the capacity of the State

1 Department and other civilian agencies to support building partner capacity. These reforms are  
2 essential to executing our strategy to achieve national objectives.

3 **THEATER COMMAND, CONTROL, AND COMMUNICATIONS SYSTEMS, AND ISR**

4 Communicating and sharing information across an expansive theater are critical  
5 capabilities and essential enablers of our Nation’s strategic mission. Whether conducting  
6 activities within the EUCOM AOR or supporting other COCOMS, the ability to command &  
7 control forces is provided by EUCOM and its partners’ Command, Control, and  
8 Communications (C3) network infrastructures. In order to continue our warfighting dominance,  
9 we must continue to evolve how we use this valuable asset, and at the same time, maintain and  
10 protect it.

11 The U.S. increasingly relies on its network of coalition partners to carry out missions  
12 abroad. Participating nations bring unique hardware, software, data structures, information, and  
13 capabilities for command and control purposes. Investments in international communications  
14 standards enable interoperable solutions for sharing of operational information. Continued  
15 development of information sharing policies enables commanders to make better decisions using  
16 timely and reliable knowledge. Together, interoperable standards and policies that facilitate  
17 information sharing will help to bridge the gap between differing systems effectively enabling  
18 command and control during coalition and combined operations.

19 Our Strategy of Active Security places forces in regions not currently supported on a day-  
20 to-day basis by the Global Information Grid (GIG). Establishing network capabilities to support  
21 operations in remote areas can only be accomplished with reliable and responsive satellite  
22 resources. Military Satellite Communications (MILSATCOM) can provide this capability,  
23 enabling the joint force secure access to critical C<sup>3</sup> ISR and logistics information. In order to

1 achieve a high level of agility and effectiveness in a dispersed, decentralized, dynamic, and  
2 uncertain operational environment, we must maintain our MILSATCOM infrastructure, ensuring  
3 it is ready, robust, and available on demand.

4 Today, current MILSATCOM systems are fragile and over-utilized. The proposed  
5 replacement architecture is plagued with delays and unacceptable disconnects between space and  
6 ground segments

7 Cyber attack activity is on the rise. Our increased reliance on network capabilities and the  
8 value of information riding on those networks becomes ever more critical. While a network-  
9 centric, web-enabled force offers a tremendous advantage in carrying out nearly every dimension  
10 of our national strategy, it will be our greatest vulnerability if left inadequately protected. The  
11 “cyber riot” in Estonia, coupled with the cyber attacks associated with the Russian incursion into  
12 Georgia, are demonstrations of potential havoc that can be created by a well-resourced and  
13 technically advanced opponent. Essentially, the network is our most vital non-kinetic weapon  
14 system. We must continue to support initiatives for defending our networks and building our  
15 cyber operations force.

16 Without continued improvements to information sharing and interoperable solutions, we  
17 limit our coalition capabilities. Without a well-maintained and protected communications  
18 infrastructure, our ability to command and control military forces becomes severely degraded.  
19 We must continue efforts to safeguard, resource, and exploit the tools enabling the most  
20 powerful weapon in our arsenal: information and the knowledge it can engender.

21

1 **QUALITY OF LIFE (QOL) PROGRAMS**

2 Quality of Life programs and services are vital contributors to our warfighting  
3 effectiveness within the European theater. Our warfighters and their families continue to endure  
4 real and perceived hardships in an operational overseas environment impacted by transformation  
5 and extended deployments. As we transform to meet emerging mission requirements, we owe it  
6 to our service and civilian members and their families to provide a safe, productive, and  
7 enriching environment. I am committed to helping improve this environment and sustain  
8 appropriate entitlements that compensate our servicemembers for their sacrifices. Our collective  
9 efforts should match their commitment to duty and country with a pledge that we will strive to  
10 provide them with a standard of living comparable to that of the society they have committed to  
11 defend.

12 EUCOM's top QoL issues are: deployment and counseling support for service members  
13 and families; support for Child, Youth, and Teen programs; predictable access to healthcare; and  
14 servicemember benefits and entitlements especially adequate housing and support for dependent  
15 education programs provided by the DoD Dependent Schools – Europe (DoDDS-E). The  
16 importance of these programs is magnified in an overseas environment where members and  
17 families cannot rely on off-base options as they do in the U.S.

18 **Deployment and Counseling Support**

19 Protracted combat operations and associated tempo and casualties have critically  
20 increased the immediate and future mental health requirements of our servicemembers and their  
21 families. Multiple studies identify the requirement for increased mental health support to  
22 military and family members including the DoD Mental Health Task Force recommendations

1 which recommended that Congress provide adequate assessment and appropriate mental and  
2 behavioral health care.

3 Because supplementing overseas counseling through off-base providers is extremely  
4 challenging due to differences in language and standards of care, Component Commanders have  
5 identified the need for additional mental health providers and technicians to provide evaluation,  
6 counseling, and when required, physiological treatment referral for EUCOM military and family  
7 members.

### 8 **Child, Youth and Teen Programs**

9 EUCOM and our Service Component Commands consistently receive requests for  
10 increased support of child development centers, school age programs, and youth and teen  
11 programs and services. Forty-four percent of EUCOM's civilian and military personnel have  
12 children. EUCOM is dedicated to supporting child, youth, and teen programs such as the child  
13 care subsidy, after school programs, summer camps, summer enrichment and summer school  
14 programs, gang prevention and awareness programs, and Drug Abuse Resistance Education  
15 (D.A.R.E.).

16 Off-base options for child, youth and teen programs are limited by culture, language  
17 barriers, lack of U.S. standards of care and quality, availability, and above-average costs  
18 compared with those at U.S.-based military communities. A recent EUCOM-wide analysis  
19 identified a staff shortage, due to difficult hiring processes and staff turn over, as the primary  
20 reason for a gap between our members' and families' child care requirements and the level of  
21 care available to provide programs that meet their needs. Our ongoing efforts to address this gap  
22 will improve EUCOM's ability to conduct and sustain our diverse missions, especially in this era  
23 of continuously high operational tempo.

1 **Access to Healthcare**

2 Family member access to both medical and dental care is challenging overseas.  
3 EUCOM’s military medical treatment facilities (MTFs) must prioritize their limited resources to  
4 ensure a ready military force. As a result, the already limited, space-available care may not  
5 cover the population and our families are frequently referred off-base to receive host nation  
6 medical and dental care. EUCOM family members must often use local community medical and  
7 dental services characterized by providers who speak a different language, manage care  
8 according to the standards of their culture, and are difficult to access and understand when  
9 compared to on-post care in a MTF.

10 Additionally, during periods when the dollar is weak, families required to use off-base  
11 care are further stressed , as upfront costs then are higher and insurance limits (expressed in  
12 dollars), especially in dental care, would be reached much sooner than in the U.S. This presents  
13 a challenge to EUCOM’s ability to sustain an adequate QoL. Our success in strengthening  
14 programs, obtaining resources and deploying beneficiary awareness campaigns will lead to  
15 healthier communities.

16

17 **Servicemember Benefits and Entitlements**

18 **Family Housing**

19 EUCOM QoL construction investments affirm our commitment to servicemembers and  
20 their families as we strive to fulfill Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) requirements to eliminate  
21 inadequate housing.

22 USAFE, NAVEUR and USAREUR continue to improve their housing inventory through  
23 the Build-to-Lease (BTL) program. Through this program, USAREUR continues the process of

1 improving Grafenwoehr, with 1,300 units acquired and 300 more new units to be acquired, to  
2 complete the project. Also, USAREUR plans to acquire 215 more BTL units in Vicenza. Each  
3 Component continues to explore additional BTL housing opportunities throughout Europe to  
4 meet housing requirements.

5 EUCOM's request for funding for family housing and barracks construction, renovation,  
6 and replacement as Quality of Life projects will follow the submission of the President's FY10  
7 budget.

### 8 **Commissaries and Exchanges**

9 Investment in commissaries and exchanges ensures our servicemembers and their  
10 families have access to the supplies and services they need and we strong encourage continued  
11 support for these key activities. The importance of these programs is magnified in an overseas  
12 environment where personnel and families cannot rely on off-base options as readily as they do  
13 in the United States.

### 14 **Department of Defense Education Activity (DoDEA) Schools**

15 EUCOM works with DoDEA and Department of Defense Dependent Schools-Europe  
16 (DoDDS-E) to provide our children with quality educational opportunities. Ensuring DoDDS-E  
17 delivers a first class education is essential to families serving in Europe, where there are no  
18 affordable off-base schooling options like those available in the U.S. DoDDS-E has 90 schools  
19 serving EUCOM's 36,500 students. These schools represent almost half of DoDEA's inventory  
20 of 199 schools. Operating and maintaining them requires constant attention.

21 Delivery of a quality education depends on quality facilities. DoDDS-E has aging  
22 schools, many of which were built prior to World War II. With 43 percent of DoDEA's students  
23 in the EUCOM theater, the health of DoDEA's facility sustainment and recapitalization budgets

1 is essential to the effectiveness of our education programs. Unfortunately, DoDEA has had a  
2 growing backlog of facility recapitalization requirements, although beginning in FY2009 ,  
3 DoDEA has put a renewed emphasis on facilities, increasing funding for facilities sustainment,  
4 restoration and modernization. World-wide, nearly 70% of DoDEA's permanent-built  
5 infrastructure is assessed by DoD facility standards as poorly maintained or in need of  
6 replacement. Within Europe, this ratio has reached 72%. Based on data in DoDEA's recently  
7 submitted Report on Condition of Schools, six of DoDEA's top ten recapitalization needs are in  
8 Europe. Some of these needs address children attending classes in long-standing temporary  
9 buildings, unable to clean up after physical education, or rushing through lunch in cramped  
10 cafeterias to accommodate multi-stage dining schedules. We strongly support DoDEA MILCON  
11 funding to meet the requirements of EUCOM families.

12 EUCOM appreciates continued Congressional support to make school construction a top  
13 quality of life priority for overseas families. Giving students and their families an education  
14 comparable to what they would receive stateside improves retention and enhances readiness.

#### 15 **NATO/SHAPE**

16 The Washington Treaty marks its 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary in 2009. For over 60 years, it has been  
17 the cornerstone of security and stability, and NATO is the world's most successful Alliance. The  
18 Alliance's current and future role in international security is set by the principles and provisions  
19 of the Washington Treaty. As the past six decades have demonstrated, NATO has protected, and  
20 will protect its members' sovereignty. Trans-Atlantic security today is not threatened by one  
21 strategic threat, but is challenged by regional and global networks of instability, which contain  
22 risks and threats to our nations individually and collectively. Consequently, 21<sup>st</sup> Century Trans-  
23 Atlantic security is by necessity part of a global network of security - interconnected with other

1 regional and global networks. NATO will play an even more critical role in the years to come in  
2 anchoring global security as NATO nations work in a comprehensive approach with members,  
3 partners, and international organizations. The Alliance is determined to enhance security and  
4 stability and to cooperate in building a stable, peaceful Europe. The benefits of Trans-Atlantic  
5 stability that we enjoy today can be extended to the insecure and unstable beyond Europe, as has  
6 been demonstrated in Afghanistan and Africa. Risks are omni-directional, and crises can  
7 develop rapidly, transforming political disputes into military conflicts. Crises must be identified,  
8 managed, and resolved. The Alliance is uniquely capable, uniquely structured, and will play a  
9 major role in the management of crises. I believe our Alliance's core mission is to be prepared  
10 to address the myriad risks that jeopardize stability in the modern era. It is my hope that the 60<sup>th</sup>  
11 Anniversary Summit will produce a renewed impetus to adapt the Alliance further to meet the  
12 demands of the security challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.

13         The threats to our security in a globalized world do not stop at national borders and  
14 cannot be successfully addressed by any nation alone. NATO is essential, as is our steadfast  
15 commitment to NATO and trans-Atlantic security. The challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> century require  
16 greater cooperation than ever in areas such as energy security, terrorism, piracy, and arms  
17 control, all supported by an integrated, robust, visible U.S. presence. To the extent possible, U.S.  
18 security policies must be sufficiently aligned with our Allies to provide mutually beneficial  
19 effects. Significant contributions of forces supporting NATO are absolutely critical, particularly  
20 to the current out-of-area operations. However, we must be mindful that EUCOM presence is  
21 our most visible form of the U.S. commitment to the Alliance. Operationally, we must maintain  
22 the appropriate EUCOM force structure to implement our strategy. Active security cooperation

1 and habitual training relationships improve operational readiness and enhance our position of  
2 influence in European security.

3 In addition to the honor of serving as Commander of EUCOM, I am privileged to  
4 command Allied Command Operations as the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe. During this  
5 past year, the men and women of NATO have worked tirelessly on behalf of the Alliance and  
6 served their nations with distinction. Our Allies and partners have answered the call to duty,  
7 fought valiantly, and paid in blood and treasure. There are now over 70,000 deployed military  
8 forces from 43 NATO and non-NATO nations conducting operations under my command on  
9 three continents. They demonstrate NATO's relevance in today's dynamic security environment.

## 10 **Operations**

11 In Afghanistan, over 55,000 men and women from 41 NATO and non-NATO partner  
12 nations assigned to ISAF are assisting the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan  
13 (GIRoA) in the establishment and maintenance of a safe and secure environment, facilitating  
14 reconstruction and development, and extending GIRoA control. In my time as SACEUR, ISAF  
15 has increased from approximately 30,000 to the current force strength. Allies have increased  
16 their contributions to this operation since 2006. We still have shortcomings in both forces and  
17 enablers, which I address with the nations. The nations of the Alliance understand the  
18 significance of this operation for the security of their people, the security of the region, and the  
19 future of the Alliance.

20 While 2008 saw a marked increase in violence by insurgents, the activity is concentrated  
21 in generally the same districts as the previous year. We attribute this increase in violence to three  
22 factors. First, ISAF and the Afghan National Army (ANA) have increased operational tempo and  
23 extended their reach into areas that were once safe havens for the insurgency. Second, the

1 Federally Administered Tribal Areas in Pakistan remain a sanctuary for the arming, training, and  
2 planning of operations against ISAF in Afghanistan. Third, insurgents have taken to attacking  
3 reconstruction and development in an effort to convince Afghans that their government cannot  
4 provide for their individual security, or the security of the International Community efforts to  
5 rebuild and reconstruct Afghanistan.

6         Development of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) is crucial to combating this  
7 trend and key to long-term success in Afghanistan. In the last year, the ANA has fielded 5  
8 infantry battalions, 4 commando battalions, 4 support battalions, and 3 brigade headquarters. The  
9 ANA participates in more than 90% of all ISAF operations and has led planning and execution of  
10 58% of the more than 200 planned operations this year. The Afghan National Army Air Corps  
11 (ANAAC) continues to grow in both size and capability due to contributions of aircraft and  
12 training teams. In the past year the ANAAC has provided 90% of the airlift required by the  
13 ANSF. Critical to the development of the ANA is the coordination between EUCOM,  
14 CENTCOM, and SHAPE in developing training and deployment programs that have resulted in  
15 48 fielded Operational Mentor and Liaison Teams (OMLTs) Another 12 teams are training to  
16 deploy this year. Additionally, SHAPE is assisting with non-U.S. sponsorship in 11 of 19 ANA  
17 schools.

18         Security must be accompanied by good governance and lasting reconstruction and  
19 development. The GIRoA struggles to deliver substantive and sustainable service to the Afghan  
20 people. Efforts are ongoing, but markedly improved conditions are still unrealized today. More  
21 than 60,000 projects are currently underway and signs of progress are evident.

22         Security in Pakistan and Afghanistan is undoubtedly linked. We must engage with  
23 Pakistan at all levels, and Pakistan must work to be part of the solution. We work with Pakistan

1 militarily in the framework of the Tripartite Commission, which is a cooperative effort  
2 comprising military representatives from ISAF, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. I believe a similar  
3 diplomatic cooperative effort is also needed.

4         The narcotics trade is a major obstacle on the road to a secure and stable Afghanistan. In  
5 October, NATO's political leaders approved enhanced counter-narcotic actions by ISAF forces  
6 against drug facilities and facilitators that support the insurgency. The nexus between the illegal  
7 drug trade and the insurgency is real, and narco-profits represent a significant funding stream to  
8 arm and train the insurgents. The objective of the ISAF action is to impact the resources made  
9 available to the insurgency through illegal drug activities. ISAF will work in support of the  
10 Afghan government. ISAF will not conduct operations to eradicate the poppy crops.

11         Whatever discussion we have about strategy, no strategy will work if it is not matched by  
12 the right resources. I have written separately to Ministers of Defense to articulate the importance  
13 of filling the Combined Joint Statement of Requirements (CJSOR). In late 2008 we saw an  
14 increase in national troop commitments and a reduction in national force caveats, though more is  
15 needed.

16         Increases in U.S. troop levels are not enough. NATO forces in Afghanistan have shown  
17 their ability to clear opposing forces from any terrain, but to hold terrain and build the nation of  
18 Afghanistan will take a much larger commitment. International organizations as well as the  
19 Afghan Government need to make greater progress thru a collective, comprehensive effort.  
20 Ambassador Kai Eide, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary General for Afghanistan,  
21 in charged to bring coherency to the international effort. He must have our steadfast support, all  
22 of it, all of the time. Euro-Atlantic and wider international security is closely tied to  
23 Afghanistan's future as a peaceful, democratic state.

1           While ISAF is our top priority, we have more than 14,000 troops from 33 NATO and  
2 partner nations in Kosovo continuing to ensure a safe and secure environment. The future roles  
3 of the UN and the European Union Rule of Law Mission are still being clarified, but NATO's  
4 mandate to ensure a safe and secure environment remains the backdrop of discussions.

5           NATO is overseeing the stand-down of the Kosovo Protection Corps, supervising and  
6 supporting the stand-up of the civilian-controlled Kosovo Security Force. This important mission  
7 requires increased resources. I have called on NATO nations to sustain their commitment to  
8 achieve success in Kosovo.

9           Our commitment to regional security and stability throughout the Balkans remains  
10 steadfast. We continue to assist in defense reform, including Partnership for Peace and NATO  
11 membership activities, through our NATO HQs in Sarajevo, Skopje, and Tirana and the Military  
12 Liaison Office in Belgrade.

13           NATO ships participating in Operation ACTIVE ENDEAVOR (OAE) continue to patrol  
14 the Mediterranean Sea in a counter-terrorism mission. Through advances in surveillance  
15 technology and contributions of non-NATO nations, OAE now maintains a continuous watch  
16 and deterrent presence of a vital strategic waterway used by more than 6,000 merchant vessels at  
17 any given time.

18           NATO provides an essential trans-Atlantic dimension to the response against terrorism.  
19 We need to strengthen the ability to share information and intelligence on terrorism, especially in  
20 support of NATO operations.

21           We train Iraqi Security Forces with just under 200 personnel assigned to the NATO  
22 Training Mission-Iraq (NTM-I). NTM-I assisted with the establishment of the Iraqi Training and

1 Doctrine Command and National Defense University, and operates the Iraqi Military Academy  
2 Ar Rustamiyah (IMAR), where two-thirds of Iraq's Second Lieutenants are trained.

3 NATO has agreed to assist the African Union (AU) mission in Somalia by providing  
4 airlift support to deploying AU member states. The first request was in June and NATO  
5 transported a battalion of Burundian peacekeepers to Mogadishu. We are also assisting making  
6 the African Standby Force operational

7 Operation ALLIED PROVIDER (OAP) was NATO's response to a request by the UN to  
8 conduct maritime operations off the coast of Somalia to deter, defend, and disrupt piracy  
9 activities and allow the World Food Program to deliver humanitarian aid to the region. We  
10 should not underestimate the importance of this decision, nor the precedent it sets for our  
11 Alliance. NATO's political leaders approved a mission for which there was no detailed  
12 contingency or operational plan, demonstrating that we can react quickly in times of crisis.  
13 NATO is considering a possible long-term role in counter-piracy that could complement UN  
14 Security Council Resolutions and actions by others, including the European Union.

15 A strong collective defense of our populations, territory, and forces is the core purpose of  
16 our Alliance and remains our most important security task. The member nations don't always see  
17 the threats in the same way nor do they always agree on the ways and means to confront them.  
18 However, difference of views is nothing new - with 26 perspectives and a system of consensus,  
19 we can be certain decisions taken by the Alliance will be well-reasoned, serve a common  
20 purpose, and be underwritten by our professional military forces.

21 There are substantial issues confronting us; issues that could challenge the success of our  
22 operations or the military credibility of the Alliance. I would like to note four of them. First,  
23 shortcomings that directly impact on our collective ability to react to crisis--forces in ongoing

1 operations, command structure, operational and strategic reserves, and the NATO Response  
2 Force (NRF). Strategic success hinges on adequate resourcing--deployed forces deserve to be  
3 fully resourced. Resourcing is the single most important means to demonstrate political will and  
4 symbolize our collective accountability to the servicemembers put in harm's way. In its current  
5 construct, the NRF has been plagued by force shortfalls and insufficient national contributions.  
6 The Peacetime Establishment Review has been an exercise in compromise and, in the end, does  
7 not meet all of our expectations. We are successfully transforming the command structure to  
8 better support and enable the operations of today and improve our ability to manage and react to  
9 crises, but we must have a properly manned HQ for the future.

10       Secondly, NATO's role as a security provider will be determined by how the Alliance  
11 performs in its military operations in meeting new security challenges. Piracy may be the  
12 immediate challenge, but others must be addressed: energy security, proliferation, and cyber  
13 attacks to name a few. At a time of financial crisis, discussion of increased capabilities and new  
14 missions is very unpopular. We need nations committed to equitable burden-sharing to achieve  
15 our stated ambition.

16       Thirdly, our operations highlight the need to develop and field modern, interoperable,  
17 flexible and sustainable forces. These forces must be able to conduct collective defense and crisis  
18 response on and beyond Alliance territory, on its periphery, and at strategic distance. We can  
19 further information superiority through networked capabilities, including an integrated air  
20 command and control system, increased maritime situational awareness and the Alliance Ground  
21 Surveillance (AGS) capability. AGS is a mix of manned and unmanned airborne radar platforms  
22 and is an essential capability for decision makers and planners. We can improve strategic lift and  
23 intra-theater airlift, especially mission-capable helicopters. A major milestone in meeting

1 Alliance strategic airlift needs was realized when ten NATO countries plus two partner countries  
2 (Finland and Sweden) signed the Memorandum of Understanding confirming their participation  
3 in the acquisition and sustainment of three C-17 strategic transport aircraft. The Alliance also  
4 clearly recognizes the importance of protecting the territory and citizens of NATO member  
5 nations and is developing options for a possible integrated NATO-wide missile defense  
6 architecture.

7         The fourth challenge is Strategic Communications. Strategically communicating the  
8 implications of NATO's policy and actions is essential. With new challenges and NATO  
9 increasingly acting in concert with other countries and institutions, it has been much more  
10 difficult for our publics to understand what NATO is all about. We need public understanding  
11 and public support. Additionally, the need for appropriate, timely, accurate and responsive  
12 communication with local and international audiences in relation to NATO's policies and  
13 operations is vital.

14         NATO's relationship with key partner nations is critically important to the overall  
15 security environment. NATO's diverse relationships with the Mediterranean nations of Africa,  
16 the Middle East, troop contributing nations from the Pacific and South America, Partnership for  
17 Peace nations from the Caucasus and Central Asia, and special relationships with Russia,  
18 Georgia, and Ukraine all demonstrate the vast potential for security cooperation, consultation,  
19 and joint action together. In particular, Albania and Croatia accession protocols have been  
20 signed, and ratification by the member nations is ongoing. I am satisfied with the progress of  
21 Albania and Croatia militarily and am confident in both national and NATO plans in place. Both  
22 nations are already valuable participants in the NATO mission in Afghanistan. We continue  
23 work with prospective members. The Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia has had a

1 membership action plan since 1999 and Georgia and Ukraine began intensified dialogue in 2006.  
2 All of these nations will contribute to Alliance security. We stand ready to further develop a  
3 substantive relationship with Serbia making full use of its Partnership for Peace (PfP)  
4 membership.

5 The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) has been a valuable mechanism for consultation,  
6 cooperation, joint decision and joint action since 2003. Russia's disproportionate use of force in  
7 the conflict with Georgia led the Alliance to suspend formal discussions and cooperation with  
8 Russia in the NATO-Russia Council. The Alliance did agree at the recent Foreign Ministers  
9 Meeting to restart the NRC some time this summer as a mechanism for dialog on issues of  
10 disagreement and on those where we have common interests. These common interests should be  
11 the focus for future engagement. We welcome Russia's approval of the Land Transit Agreement  
12 (LTA), allowing transit of NATO non-military goods through Russia to Afghanistan via Central  
13 Asia.

14 In 2009, 60 years after the signing of the Washington Treaty, 18 years after the end of the Cold  
15 War, the Alliance is engaged with the broadest set of challenges, risks, and threats in its history,  
16 reflecting the increasingly complex and multi-layered nature of the 21<sup>st</sup> century security  
17 environment. U.S. leadership in NATO is critical to our national security, as well as being  
18 critical to the success of NATO. As we look to the future with the goal of building a stable,  
19 secure, and united Europe, NATO should be an anchor in the framework of a turbulent global  
20 environment, a source of political solidarity to confront these challenges with a comprehensive  
21 and strategic approach, and have capabilities and capacities sufficient to respond rapidly.  
22 EUCOM's role is vital to sustaining U.S. leadership within the Alliance, shaping the  
23 comprehensive and strategic approach necessary, and providing the capabilities and capacities to

1 respond rapidly to NATO's call. U.S. military contributions are only possible with the staunch  
2 and steady support of Congress and we greatly appreciate your leadership and assistance.

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4

#### **CONCLUSION**

5 EUCOM works with other U.S. government agencies using a whole-of-government  
6 approach to strengthen U.S. leadership in its Area of Responsibility even as we support  
7 operations in other theaters. EUCOM's overall mission to defend the homeland and create an  
8 environment that advances U.S. strategic and economic interests is accomplished in many ways,  
9 the most effective of which are our BPC efforts. Building Partner Capacity has also been a key  
10 function of NATO throughout its existence. In the last two decades it has taken on an additional  
11 dimension as NATO as an organization and its members as individual nations export security to  
12 other nations in Europe, Eurasia, and Africa. NATO, as an alliance of shared values, remains the  
13 essential forum for trans-Atlantic security consultations and cooperation, helping us and our  
14 partners confront common threats in a unified manner.

15 Challenges in the region are both numerous and dynamic. In Europe, threats to the  
16 independence of nations in the Baltics, conflict over missile defense, Kosovo's disputed status,  
17 the numerous other reduced but not eliminated conflicts in the Balkans, enormous stockpiles of  
18 legacy ammunition, and terrorist attacks by the Kurdistan Worker's Party threaten the  
19 establishment of a secure environment in Europe. In the Black Sea/Eurasia region, the impact of  
20 a more assertive Russia, in particular the challenges produced by its conflict with Georgia, frozen  
21 conflicts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, between Georgia and its separatist regions, between  
22 Transdnistra and Moldova, and the potential repercussions of the status of the Crimea present

1 similar challenges. The Israel-Palestinian conflict produces tensions not only in the immediate  
2 vicinity but also far beyond it.

3         Using eight long-term objectives and seven immediate priorities, EUCOM's *Strategy of*  
4 *Active Security* guides the Command in reducing all of these challenges. Adapting EUCOM's  
5 structure and infrastructure to the new challenges requires strategic theater transformation, which  
6 affects not only EUCOM headquarters and its associated agencies, but the five subordinate  
7 commands as well.

8         The assistance of the Members of this Committee is essential in ensuring EUCOM's  
9 effectiveness in its ongoing programs, operations and initiatives. Your efforts underpin  
10 EUCOM's ability to operate across the entire spectrum of military missions. Committee support  
11 also sustains effective engagement with, and credible support to, the NATO Alliance and our  
12 regional partners. Since 1952 the dedicated men and women of the United States European  
13 Command have remained committed and able to achieve our national goals. Your support  
14 allows them to continue in this proud tradition.