

**STATEMENT OF  
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COMMAND;  
AND COMMANDER, UNITED STATES FORCES KOREA  
BEFORE THE  
HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE  
MILCON/VETERANS AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE  
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## **I. INTRODUCTION**

Mr. Chairman and distinguished members of the committee, I am honored to provide my statement to you. As the Commander, United Nations Command (UNC); Commander, Republic of Korea – United States (U.S.) Combined Forces Command (CFC); and Commander, United States Forces Korea (USFK), it is a privilege to represent the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, Department of Defense (DoD) Civilians, and their families who serve our great nation in the Republic of Korea (ROK). On behalf of these outstanding men and women, thank you for your support of American forces stationed in the ROK and your commitment to improving the quality of life for Command personnel and their families. Your sustained support allows us to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, which in turn promotes peace and stability in the region of Northeast Asia and helps protect the national interests we share with regional partners. I appreciate this opportunity to report on the state of affairs on the Korean Peninsula, my Command priorities, the plans in place for organizational transformation of the commands I lead, and how this change will strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance.

This year we mark the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of the Korean War, a three-year conflict that resulted in millions of military and civilian casualties and has yet to be concluded by a formal peace agreement. This year my commands will support a host of ROK led events to honor those who played a role in repelling North Korea's aggression of six decades ago. Also this year we recognize the 57<sup>th</sup> anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Serving as a cornerstone for the broader ROK-U.S. Alliance, mutual commitments under the

treaty have allowed the Alliance to deter aggression against the ROK and promote peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia.

The Korean Peninsula sits at the center of Northeast Asia – a dynamic region that has significant national interests for the U.S.<sup>1</sup> Northeast Asia is home to four of the world's six largest militaries in terms of personnel and two nuclear powers (China and Russia).<sup>2</sup> The region contains 25% of the world's population and is an economic powerhouse.<sup>3</sup> In 2009, Northeast Asia housed five of the world's 19 largest economies that collectively accounted for 24.8% of global gross domestic product during that year.<sup>4</sup> Countries in the region also accounted for 25.8% of U.S. trade in goods during 2009.<sup>5</sup> At the end of 2008, the U.S. direct investment position in Northeast Asia was valued at \$220.7 billion.<sup>6</sup>

While Northeast Asia has grown into a major economic region, it is also characterized by uncertainty, complexity, and rapid change. Historical animosities, territorial disputes, competition over access to resources, and struggles for regional hegemony have combined to pose difficult and long-term security challenges not only for regional states but also for the

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<sup>1</sup> The region of Northeast Asia is defined to include the following countries and special administrative regions: China, North Korea, Hong Kong, Japan, Macau, Mongolia, ROK, Russia, and Taiwan.

<sup>2</sup> In terms of number of personnel in the armed forces, the world's six largest militaries during the year 2009 were: China (2.1 million personnel); U.S. (1.54 million); India (1.28 million); North Korea (1.2 million); Russia (1.02 million); and the ROK (687,000). Personnel data obtained from *The Military Balance 2009*, produced by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

<sup>3</sup> Population percentage calculated with data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*. Percentage is as of July 2009.

<sup>4</sup> Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at purchasing power parity in the year 2009 for the economies of Northeast Asia were: China-\$8.7 trillion; Japan-\$4.1 trillion; Russia-\$2.1 trillion; ROK-\$1.3 trillion; Taiwan-\$693 billion; Hong Kong-\$301 billion; North Korea-\$40 billion (2008); Macau-\$18 billion; and Mongolia-\$10 billion. GDP data obtained from the *CIA World Fact Book*.

<sup>5</sup> U.S. trade in goods during 2009 was valued at \$366 billion with China, \$147 billion with Japan, \$67 billion with the ROK, \$46 billion with Taiwan, \$23 billion with Russia, \$55 million with Mongolia, \$24 billion with Hong Kong, \$446 million with Macau, and \$900,000 with North Korea. Trade data was obtained from the U.S. Census Bureau.

<sup>6</sup> The direct investment figure is on a historical cost basis and was obtained from data published by the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis. Countries/special administrative region included in the valuation are China, Hong Kong, Japan, Taiwan, and the ROK.

international community. U.S. force presence in the ROK is a long-term investment in regional peace and stability and both maintains security commitments to the ROK established under the Mutual Defense Treaty and reinforces American engagement with actors throughout Northeast Asia. U.S. force presence in the ROK also helps set the conditions for denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and eventual reunification of the two Koreas in a peaceful manner. A strong ROK-U.S. Alliance, with a meaningful U.S. force presence on the Korean Peninsula, is essential to meet the security challenges posed in the dynamic and economically growing region of Northeast Asia. As observed in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, achieving core missions of American armed forces requires strong security relationships with allies and partners that are best enabled and maintained through long-term presence and sustained interaction.

## **II. STATE OF AFFAIRS IN KOREA**

### **ASSESSMENT OF THE ROK**

Last month ROK President Lee Myung-bak marked the start of the third year of his five-year term in office.<sup>7</sup> President Lee Myung-bak has committed the ROK to taking on a more global orientation in its policies and to assume a greater role in the international community. Indeed, President Lee has made the development of a “Global Korea” one of five national goals for the ROK.<sup>8</sup> Later this year the city of Seoul will host a Group of 20 (G20) summit and at the end of 2009 the ROK officially joined the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s Development Assistance Committee, pledging to nearly triple its current level of

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<sup>7</sup> In the ROK, Presidents serve a single, five-year term of office without the possibility of re-election.

<sup>8</sup> The other four national goals are to develop a government serving the people, a lively market economy, active welfare, and a country rich in talent. See the ROK Office of the President (Blue House) web-site.

official development assistance to a value that will equal 0.25% of gross national income in the year 2015. The ROK's commitment to assume a greater role in the international community is evidenced by its participation in about a dozen peacekeeping operations around the world, its plans to form a 3,000 person military unit that can be rapidly deployed in support of such operations, and a general willingness to support international stability and reconstruction operations such as in Haiti and Afghanistan (where in Afghanistan the ROK will deploy a Provincial Reconstruction Team later this year).<sup>9</sup>

In June 2009 the ROK government released a revision to its National Defense Reform 2020 plan. First written in 2005, the defense reform plan aims to modernize and restructure the ROK military through 2020 so that it is ready to address the future security environment and challenges. The revised plan focuses on developing capabilities to address North Korea's asymmetric threats (identified as its nuclear and missile programs), successful transition of wartime operational control (OPCON) to the ROK military, enhancing jointness, developing network centric warfare capabilities, increasing managerial efficiencies to include the extensive use of civil resources, enhancing the ability to participate in operations sponsored by the international community, and contributing to development of the national economy. The objective is to develop an information and technology-intensive military force that can cope well with a comprehensive set of security threats. As stated by President Lee during his 1 October 2009 Armed Forces Day speech, the ROK military must transform into a highly efficient multi-purpose professional elite force that can support Korea's bid to carry out roles commensurate

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<sup>9</sup> Peacekeeping operations include UNIFIL (Lebanon), UNOMIL (Liberia), UNAMA (Afghanistan), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIN (Nepal), UNOCI (Ivory Coast), MINURSO (Western Sahara), UNMOGIP (India/Pakistan), Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan.

with its growing international stature. Through 2020 the ROK plans on spending an accumulative 599.3 trillion won (\$466 billion) on defense to include expenditures on this reform initiative. I fully support the ROK's Defense Reform 2020 initiative and hope the plan is fully resourced throughout the life of the program.

## **ASSESSMENT OF NORTH KOREA**

North Korea continues to be a threat to regional as well as global security and prosperity. Over the past year, Pyongyang's foreign policy alternated from provocative actions to a willingness to engage in some forms of dialogue. North Korea tested its nuclear and missile capabilities and continued attempts to proliferate conventional arms and other materials in violation of United Nations Security Council resolutions. Pyongyang has also maintained its aging but massive forward deployed conventional military force. North Korea will remain a serious security threat in the region and a significant concern for the U.S and the international community for the foreseeable future.

### ***Strategy, Goals, and Internal Dynamics***

Kim Jong-il's strategic goal is the survival and continuance of his regime. North Korea's efforts to build a nuclear arms program have become the key component of its strategy to guarantee regime survival. This program is now assessed to have enough plutonium for several nuclear weapons. Nearly sixteen years after the signing of the 1994 Agreed Framework, Pyongyang continues to try to develop nuclear capabilities. In 2009, it announced a second nuclear test, made public statements about its plutonium reprocessing and weaponization activities, and announced progress in uranium enrichment. These efforts, along with the

sustained development of a complementary missile delivery system, will likely continue into the foreseeable future. North Korea appears to desire international recognition as a nuclear weapons state, which the U.S., the ROK, and many members of the international community (including five members of the Six-Party Talks) have made clear is unacceptable.

On the domestic front, Kim Jong-il appears to have recovered from an apparent stroke in the summer of 2008 and remains in full control of North Korea. Over the past year Kim has systematically introduced his third and youngest son – Kim Jong-eun – as the heir apparent. Meanwhile, North Korea's ruling elite, whose privileged position apparently rests upon continuance of the status quo, appears unwavering in its loyalty to Kim Jong-il. The role of the military in Pyongyang's decision-making apparatus appears to be more prominent, as highlighted by last year's expansion of the National Defense Commission authorities. North Korea's conventional and asymmetric military forces remain the guarantor of Kim's power. The regime manufactures the perception of an external threat – primarily from the U.S. – to maintain internal control and justify its “military first” policy.

### ***A Year of Pyongyang Provocations and Posturing***

Last year, North Korea initiated a series of provocative actions against the ROK, including announcing its unilateral nullification of the 1991 South-North Basic Agreement, restrictions of ROK activity at the Kaesong Industrial Complex (KIC), and threats against ROK naval forces off the western coast of the Peninsula. Pyongyang in April launched a Taepo Dong-2 and in May announced that it conducted a second nuclear test in defiance of United Nations Security Council resolutions. North Korea also launched multiple shorter range missiles

off its eastern coast, reversed disablement procedures at its Yongbyon nuclear facility, announced the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel to obtain additional fissile material, announced its withdrawal from the Six-Party Talks, and stated its intent not to abide by the 1953 Armistice Agreement.

In August, Pyongyang released two detained American journalists, a detained South Korean KIC employee, and four detained ROK fisherman. Pyongyang also lifted its earlier imposed KIC border restrictions and allowed inter-Korean family reunions at Mount Kumgang. But in October, North Korea launched more missiles, announced that its uranium enrichment development program was in its final stages and that all plutonium had been harvested and would be weaponized, and provoked an inter-Korean naval skirmish.

North Korea's provocations during the first half of 2009 may have been intended to test the resolve of the new administration in Washington, create tension in ROK domestic politics, or set conditions internally for the introduction of a regime successor. Of North Korea's true intentions, we know little. But what is clear is that these actions resulted in the North's further isolation – highlighted by unanimous passage of additional United Nations Security Council sanctions – and pressure to return to denuclearization talks from all five parties, including China and Russia. After these events, North Korea launched a “charm offensive” in the second half of 2009, inviting foreign visitors and business interests to visit the country. This has not yet led to any measurable progress towards the complete and verifiable denuclearization of North Korea.

Last year, North Korea's annual domestic food production remained dismal, with the country dependent upon international assistance to meet its basic subsistence requirements.

Despite its serious economic problems, Pyongyang reportedly continued to divert precious national resources to its conventional and asymmetric military forces. At year's end, North Korea announced a currency redenomination which appears to have confiscated what little wealth might have been accumulated by private farmers and traders and which many now regard as a failure.

Though aging and technologically inferior, North Korea's massive army and vast artillery forces continue to represent a substantial threat capable of initiating limited offensives against the ROK that could potentially cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars in damage. North Korea also continued to develop its missile forces by attempting a multi-stage space launch vehicle, as well as multiple theater ballistic missile launches. Pyongyang continued to focus resources on its conventional and asymmetric military forces despite food shortages and a faltering economy. North Korea's missile capabilities remain a significant regional and global threat.

### ***North Korea Threat Outlook***

My number one concern will remain Pyongyang's continuing attempts to develop its nuclear and missile capabilities. The full potential of these capabilities would threaten the U.S., our regional allies, and the international community. We must also be mindful of the potential for instability in North Korea. Combined with the country's disastrous centralized economy, dilapidated industrial sector, insufficient agricultural base, malnourished military and populace, and developing nuclear programs, the possibility of a sudden leadership change in the North could be destabilizing and unpredictable.

In the future, Pyongyang may continue its strategy of periodically heightening tensions. We must never be complacent about the possibility that North Korea might take additional provocative steps or even launch an attack on the ROK. To address this threat, UNC/CFC/USFK must maintain the highest level of readiness.

### **III. COMMAND PRIORITIES**

I have established three priorities for the commands. These priorities have remained constant and serve as the guiding principles for all key initiatives pursued. The three priorities are: 1) be prepared to fight and win; 2) strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance; and 3) improve the quality of life for all service members, DoD civilians, and their families. I will address each of these priorities and the key initiatives within each below.

#### **PREPARED TO FIGHT AND WIN**

My first priority as Commander of UNC, CFC, and USFK is to maintain trained, ready, and disciplined combined and joint commands that are prepared to fight and win. This has been the focus of U.S. forces stationed in Korea for more than 50 years and for the CFC since it was established in 1978. Maintaining “fight tonight” readiness is the primary reason U.S. forces are stationed in the ROK, supporting the alliance between the American and Korean people in defense of the ROK. The Alliance stands ready to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge with little warning on the Korean Peninsula. This spectrum of conflict ranges from major combat operations under conditions of general war or provocation, to multiple possibilities of destabilizing conditions on the Peninsula, to humanitarian assistance operations, and even the

elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Given these varied potential security challenges, it is imperative that our forces maintain the highest possible level of training and readiness.

In order to address the full spectrum of conflict that could emerge on the Korean Peninsula, the Command has developed and constantly refines plans to deter aggression against the ROK, defeat aggression should deterrence fail, and respond to other destabilizing conditions that could affect the ROK. U.S. and ROK military personnel develop and maintain their warfighting skills through tough, realistic training to include theater-level exercises that leverage a variety of facilities and ranges located in the ROK.

The Command conducts two annual exercises: Key Resolve/Foal Eagle and Ulchi Freedom Guardian. Key Resolve, a Command Post Exercise focused on crisis management, trains and sharpens skills on how we will fight today using existing organizational structures where CFC executes command and control over the combined force. Foal Eagle is a large-scale combined field training exercise that includes the strategic deployment of American forces from bases in the U.S. as well as the participation of thousands of ROK troops. Key Resolve and Foal Eagle ensure that CFC remains ready today to decisively defeat any aggression that is directed against the ROK. The second annual exercise – Ulchi Freedom Guardian – is a computer-simulated warfighting exercise that focuses on the development of Alliance command and control structures that will exist after the transition of wartime OPCON of ROK forces in April 2012.

Maintaining “fight tonight” readiness can only occur when training is conducted that prepares forces to address the full spectrum of operations that characterizes today’s complex

operational environment. It is vital that Command training facilities and events support the full transformation of U.S. military forces stationed in the ROK. The U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps possess adequate training resources in the ROK to maintain unit combat readiness to include the rehearsal of robust amphibious operations. But USFK still faces challenges with respect to the training of air forces located in the ROK. We have made progress with our ROK hosts in scheduling and maximizing use of limited ranges. However, there is still insufficient training range capability and capacity. A continued shortfall in electronic warfare training capability and restrictions placed on precision guided munitions training pose deficiencies that must be addressed. Deployments of U.S. air forces to training events outside the Korean Peninsula mitigate current training shortfalls and ensure the same standard of training and readiness as American combat air forces not located in the ROK. This is not a long-term solution, however, and I continue to work with the ROK government to find a solution to this key training and readiness issue.

### **STRENGTHEN THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE**

My second priority is to strengthen the ROK-U.S. Alliance. This supports the June 2009 ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement that commits both nations to build an Alliance that ensures a peaceful, secure, and prosperous future for the Korean Peninsula, the Asia-Pacific region, and the world as a whole.

The most significant Alliance strengthening initiative is the transition to ROK-led defense on the Korean Peninsula. That is, the transition of wartime OPCON. Following the transition of peacetime OPCON in 1994, this initiative to transition wartime OPCON resumed in

October 2005, when the ROK President stated that the time had come for Seoul to be responsible for its own defense. In early 2007, it was determined that the ROK would assume wartime OPCON of its forces by April 2012. Under OPCON transition, the ROK and U.S. will disestablish CFC and stand up separate, but complementary, national commands consistent with the Mutual Defense Treaty to focus on combined defense of the ROK. After OPCON transition the ROK Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) will become the supported – or lead – command and the newly created U.S. Korea Command (KORCOM) will be the supporting command. OPCON transition will not result in independent OPCON nor require independent, self-reliant ROK forces. It also will not lead to a reduction in USFK forces or weaken the U.S. commitment to provide reinforcement to the Korean Peninsula. Rather, the Alliance will continue close strategic coordination and consultation to ensure the appropriate capabilities are in place to meet future threats. The U.S. will have the same commitment to the Alliance after OPCON transition that it does now – to include the provision of extended deterrence using the full range of military capabilities.

The combined roadmap toward OPCON transition is laid out in the Strategic Transition Plan (STP). The STP summarizes 20 high level tasks and associated sub-tasks and milestones needed to develop appropriate ROK and U.S. organizations, plans, processes, and systems for the future Alliance military structure. It is a methodical approach that ensures the new command and control relationship between ROK and U.S. forces will be even more effective than the current CFC construct. To ensure that all tasks are completed to standard, a detailed certification process has been established. Both American and Korean external senior observers are being used to help evaluate the new commands. These advisors use a detailed checklist to report to the

ROK JCS Chairman and U.S. KORCOM commander as well as to the U.S. Secretary of Defense and ROK Minister of National Defense during the annual Security Consultative Meeting.

Additional evaluation and further development is conducted through the Command theater exercise program. The Ulchi Freedom Guardian (UFG) computer simulated warfighting exercise is the Command's preeminent combined exercise to test, develop, and refine post-OPCON transition command and control arrangements. Two UFG exercises have already been conducted and two more will be held prior to a final OPCON transition certification exercise in 2012. These exercises help ensure that the new combined command structure will be trained and ready to fight and win on the day of OPCON transition. The STP is on track as planned and we are working hard to ensure that all conditions will be met for a smooth OPCON transition on 17 April 2012.

The rationale for OPCON transition emanates from the tremendous changes that have occurred in the ROK since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. The ROK today is a secure democracy and a global economic leader. By assuming the lead for its own defense, the ROK will send a strong message not only to North Korea but to the rest of the world that it has a strong, competent, and capable military that can take the lead role in securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. South Korean leaders have proven their ability to lead forces in a changing regional and global environment. They are members of a combined task force and are participating in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Officers of the ROK military, who have grown up in the Korean culture and are well versed with relevant operations plans while also being familiar with the Korean Peninsula's terrain, are best equipped to protect the Korean people. After OPCON transition occurs, the ROK military will be fully capable of leading the

combined warfight in defense of its people and the U.S. will remain committed to ROK defense through its supporting role.

Another key Alliance strengthening initiative was the conclusion of a five-year (2009-2013) cost sharing agreement in January 2009. Known as the Special Measures Agreement (SMA), this cost sharing arrangement has the ROK provide USFK with valuable labor and logistics services as well as the design (paid for in cash) and in-kind construction of facilities and infrastructure needed for daily operation of the Command. Under the SMA, ROK support for the maintenance of USFK ensures that the Command maintains its “fight tonight” readiness, a factor that helps deter aggression against the ROK and preserves peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula. SMA contributions also help build the infrastructure needed for a long-term U.S. force presence in the ROK. SMA funds help stimulate the ROK economy through the payment of Korean national employee wages, Korean service contracts, and Korean construction contracts, serving as a source of economic growth for communities that host USFK facilities. During calendar year 2010 the ROK will provide USFK with 790.4 billion won (\$664 million) in cost sharing support.<sup>10</sup> Future increases in the ROK cost sharing contribution through the year 2013 are tied to changes in the ROK consumer price index.

Finally, the Command’s *Good Neighbor Program* continues to make great progress in strengthening the ROK-U.S. Alliance. The purpose of the program is to conduct community outreach events that engage and connect the Command with the Korean community. Good Neighbor Program events educate, inform, and familiarize Koreans with the mission and purpose of USFK. This direct engagement allows Americans and Koreans to develop mutual

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<sup>10</sup> U.S. dollar figure calculated by using a forecasted average 2010 won-\$U.S. exchange rate of 1,191. This forecasted exchange rate was obtained from the U.S. DoD.

understanding of one another's cultures, customs, and lifestyles, often leading to the formation of lifelong friendships between members of the two communities. Examples of events conducted by the Good Neighbor Program include English-language camps, speaking engagements by U.S. military personnel, and tours of the Joint Security Area/Demilitarized Zone and USFK installations. The program promotes two-way exchange between USFK personnel and people of our host country. The program helps foster exchange, understanding, and cooperation between members of my Command and the Korean communities that exist alongside USFK facilities. In 2009 alone, 2,043 events were conducted with the participation of over 139,000 local nationals. The ROK Ministry of National Defense operates similar programs called *Friends Forever* and the *Experience Korean Culture Program*. Under these two programs, USFK personnel are given the opportunity to experience Korean culture by participating in various host-nation sponsored events and tours. These programs strengthen the Alliance at both the professional and personal levels.

## **IMPROVE QUALITY OF LIFE FOR COMMAND PERSONNEL**

Improving the quality of life for service members, DoD civilians, and their families is my third priority. My overall objective is to establish the infrastructure and operational climate that makes Korea the assignment of choice for DoD personnel. In order to achieve this objective and support this priority, the Command is currently implementing two key initiatives: the relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK and tour normalization.

### ***Relocation of U.S. Forces in the ROK***

The Command is implementing two separate relocation plans. Once completed, American forces will be stationed in the ROK on two primary “hubs” of five enduring sites.<sup>11</sup> The first plan – named the Yongsan Relocation Plan (YRP) – will move forces currently stationed in and around the capital city of Seoul to U.S. Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys, which is located near the city of Pyeongtaek some 40 miles south of Seoul. The majority of costs associated with this relocation plan will be paid by the ROK. The second plan, called the Land Partnership Plan (LPP), moves the 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division from locations north of Seoul to areas south of the Han River and expands infrastructure at Osan Air Base and Camp Mujuk. Costs associated with the LPP will be shared between the ROK and U.S. While the YRP and LPP programs are being executed, actions will be taken to maintain our current facilities at an acceptable standard in order to support current operations.

The relocation of U.S. forces in Korea will occur in two distinct phases: consolidation and relocation. Phase I – consolidation – is currently underway. The current U.S. troop level of 28,500 personnel will remain on the Peninsula. The Command has returned 37 installations to the ROK so far, in the process giving thousands of acres of land back to the Korean people. In turn, the ROK has purchased land that is needed to accommodate USFK relocation. The ROK government has granted land at USAG Humphreys, an action that has enabled the ROK-U.S. Alliance to begin designing, planning, and construction of what will become one of the best Army installations in the world. The major facilities that will be constructed include medical

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<sup>11</sup> The two primary hubs are centered on Osan Air Base/United States Army Garrison (USAG) Humphreys and USAG Daegu. The five enduring sites are Osan Air Base, USAG Humphreys, USAG Daegu, Chinhae Naval Base, and Kunsan Air Base.

facilities, headquarters buildings, family housing, schools, a communications center, and other operational and support infrastructure needed to accommodate the relocation of 2<sup>nd</sup> Infantry Division.

Phase II of USFK relocation will involve the movement of Army forces to one of the two enduring hubs that will be located south of Seoul. Once this phase is completed, USFK forces will utilize 48 separate sites, well below the 104 facilities USFK maintained in 2002. The success of the relocation initiative will sustain USFK's "fight tonight" readiness. Unit moves in the relocation plan will be packaged and executed in manageable components, which will allow units to maintain their full spectrum of operational and support capabilities. Completion of the relocation initiative will be a great boon for the ROK-U.S. Alliance because it improves readiness and soldier quality of life, realizes stationing efficiencies, signals continued U.S. commitment to the region, improves the combined capability to deter and defend against aggression directed at the ROK, and optimizes use of Korean land by creating a less intrusive military footprint, thus enhancing force protection for USFK.

### ***Tour Normalization***

DoD approved plans to normalize the tours of all service members in the ROK on December 1, 2008.<sup>12</sup> As noted in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, DoD's long-term goal is to phase out all unaccompanied tours in Korea. This goal will mean all service members stationed in the ROK will be on 36-month accompanied or 24-month unaccompanied tours. Single troops will serve 24-months. Prior to this policy change, the majority of U.S. military

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<sup>12</sup> It should be noted that in August 2009 the standard length of tour for USFK civilian personnel was increased from 24-months to 36-months.

personnel serving in the ROK were on one-year unaccompanied assignments. For military personnel with dependents, tour normalization means that they can be accompanied by their family members while serving our nation in the ROK, something that has been done in Europe for decades. Once complete, there will be approximately 14,500 families in Korea.

Phase I is currently under way and will run through Fiscal Year (FY) 2011. During this phase, the number of command sponsored families in the ROK will almost triple from the start of this phase, to 4,932. The length of accompanied tours offered in five locations – Seoul, Osan, Pyeongtaek, Daegu, and Chinhae – are now 36 months and for areas north of Seoul (Dongducheon and Uijeongbu, referred to as Area I) are 24 months. Single soldiers serve a 12-month tour.

The tour normalization process will synchronize increases in the number of command sponsored (accompanied tour) service members and their families with the expansion of necessary infrastructure such as housing, schools, medical facilities, and other infrastructure needed to accommodate this growth. Throughout the phased tour normalization process, the funding for needed infrastructure could come from three key sources: public and private ventures, appropriated military construction funds, and ROK cost sharing contributions where appropriate.

The tour normalization initiative benefits the Command, DoD personnel serving in the ROK, military families, the ROK-U.S. Alliance, and U.S. national interests. Full implementation of this initiative improves force readiness and combat capability by keeping trained military personnel in place for longer periods of time, thus enhancing continuity, stability, and the retention of institutional, regional, and cultural knowledge. It will also reduce the stress placed

on troops and units by frequent rotations and supports the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review's "preserve and enhance" objective by establishing a sustainable rotation rate that helps protect the force's long-term health. Quality of life for our service members will be greatly improved through the elimination of needless separation from their families and the use of modern DoD standard design facilities. The ROK-U.S. Alliance will be enhanced by the more meaningful and deeper interaction between Americans and Koreans that can occur during a tour of longer duration. Finally, U.S. national interests are supported through the signal tour normalization sends on U.S. commitment to the long-term security and stability of the ROK as well as Northeast Asia as a whole.

### ***Military Construction***

A total of \$46.5 million of military construction has been requested in the U.S. Government Fiscal Year 2011 Defense Budget. This request will fund the upgrade of electrical and natural gas systems at Camp Walker (\$19.5 million), the construction of a Distributed Mission Training flight simulator facility at Kunsan (\$7.5 million), and the expansion of a health and dental clinic at Camp Carroll (\$19.5 million). These military construction projects will – if funded – improve facility operation, training, and the quality of life for Command personnel, enhancing overall force readiness.

## **IV. FUTURE OF THE ROK-U.S. ALLIANCE**

A key part of U.S. security policy in Asia is the construction of a comprehensive strategic alliance with the ROK as specified in the June 2009 Joint Vision statement. This comprehensive strategic alliance will be bilateral, regional, and global in scope and will be based on common

values and mutual trust. We will maintain a robust defense posture backed by allied capabilities which support both nations' security interests. Just as today, in the future the ROK-U.S. Alliance will remain vital to securing peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula and in Northeast Asia as a whole. The U.S. will maintain its commitment to the defense of the ROK through the employment of capabilities postured both on and off the Korean Peninsula. Similarly, the U.S. welcomes recent moves by the ROK to expand its role in the international community at a level that is commensurate with its growing international stature. The U.S. will continue to provide extended deterrence for the ROK using the full range of military capabilities to include the nuclear umbrella, conventional strike, and missile defense capabilities. As the ROK-U.S. Alliance evolves in the future, we will cooperate on a wide-ranging set of global security challenges that are of mutual interest to include peacekeeping activities, stabilization and reconstruction efforts, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief.

Over the next decade or so the security component of the Alliance will experience some of the most profound changes since the Mutual Defense Treaty was signed in 1953. Three of these key changes are the transition of wartime OPCON, relocation of U.S. forces stationed in the ROK onto two enduring hubs, and tour normalization. These transformational changes will strengthen the Alliance and enhance its stabilizing role on the Korean Peninsula and in the wider area of Northeast Asia. The process of change will also be supported by implementation of the ROK Defense Reform 2020 initiative. As the Alliance transforms, United Nations Command will continue to provide a coalition of 15 nations ready to provide support for defense of the ROK as well as conduct its armistice maintenance functions through the Military Armistice Commission.

Through Alliance transformation we seek to build a better future for Koreans and Americans by establishing a durable peace on the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia and setting the conditions for peaceful reunification of the two Koreas. As Alliance partners, the ROK and U.S. will work together toward achieving complete and verifiable elimination of North Korea's nuclear and ballistic missile programs. In the Asia-Pacific region the Alliance will work jointly with regional institutions and partners to foster prosperity, maintain peace, and improve the daily lives of people. To enhance security in the Asia-Pacific area the ROK and U.S. governments will advocate for – and take part in – effective cooperative regional efforts to promote mutual understanding, confidence, and transparency regarding security issues among nations of this region. The two governments will also work closely to address the global challenges of the North Korean threat, terrorism, weapons of mass destruction proliferation, and piracy. The ROK and U.S. will also enhance coordination on peacekeeping operations and post-conflict stabilization and development assistance. In the end, the two countries will work toward achieving Alliance goals through strategic cooperation at every level.

## **V. SUMMARY**

This year marks the 60<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the start of the Korean War. Thanks to the sacrifice and selfless service of a countless number of Koreans, Americans, and people of other nationalities, North Korea's aggression was repelled. This year also marks the 57<sup>th</sup> anniversary of signing the ROK-U.S. Mutual Defense Treaty. Thanks to the peace and stability created by the Alliance structures that emanated from this mutual defense pact, the ROK has been able to develop into a democratic industrialized state with a high standard of living and a growing role in

the international community. By promoting peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula, the ROK-U.S. Alliance has not only set the conditions for successful development of the ROK over the last six decades, but also promoted peace and stability in the broader region of Northeast Asia – a region of key national interest to the U.S.

The ROK-U.S. Joint Vision statement of June 2009 looks to the future and sets out a path for taking the next step in Alliance development – building a comprehensive strategic alliance. My three command priorities of being prepared to fight and win, strengthening the Alliance, and improving the quality of life for Command personnel support this next step in Alliance evolution. In particular, the transition of wartime OPCON recognizes the substantial growth and development that has occurred in the ROK over the last 60 years, and rightly places the ROK in the lead position for its own defense. The relocation of U.S. forces in the ROK improves readiness and soldier quality of life. Finally, our normalization greatly increases our capability and demonstrates long-term U.S. commitment to the Alliance, an Alliance that has served the Korean and American people so well for over half a century.

I am extremely proud of the Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen, Marines, DoD Civilians, and their families serving our great nation in the ROK. Their selfless service promotes peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula as well as in the broader region of Northeast Asia. Your support for them and the ROK-U.S. Alliance is greatly appreciated. I am certain you will agree that our men and women in uniform deserve the very best working, living, and training environment that can be provided, and that we should do everything in our power to provide it. Thank you.