

STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD
AMBASSADOR-AT-LARGE FOR COUNTERTERRORISM
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U.S. HOUSE APPROPRIATIONS COMMITTEE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON STATE, FOREIGN OPERATIONS, AND
RELATED PROGRAMS

FISCAL YEAR 2011 BUDGET REQUEST FOR
S/CT ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS

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1:30 PM

Chairwoman Lowey, Ranking Member Granger, members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today.

I appreciate the opportunity to testify, along with my colleagues from State Department's Political-Military Affairs Bureau and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau, on how President Obama's Fiscal Year 2011 budget request for assistance programs will contribute to our collective efforts to improve both national and international security, especially with regard to counterterrorism. As the State Department's Coordinator for Counterterrorism (S/CT), I am charged with coordinating the terrorism-related assistance the U.S. government provides to foreign countries.

My office coordinates U.S. government international counterterrorism policy. This includes building the political will and capacity of foreign partners so

they can identify, interdict, and defeat terrorists. In order to achieve this end, our work includes helping partner nations develop capacities in law enforcement, border control, and financial regulation. Within the U.S. government, we have many partners both inside and outside the State Department, in fulfilling our mission to forge partnerships with foreign governments, non-state actors and multilateral organizations, to advance the counterterrorism objectives and national security of the United States. The Political-Military Affairs (PM) Bureau and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau are two of the key State Department's bureaus with which we collaborate closely in this effort.

President Obama has requested \$294,103,000 for Fiscal Year 2011 in Nonproliferation, Anti-terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) funds for State Department's Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. This request includes \$15,000,000 for the new Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program; \$43,050,000 for the Terrorist Interdiction Program/Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (TIP/PISCES) program; \$205,103,000 for the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program; \$20,950,000 for the Counterterrorism Finance Training (CTF) program; and \$10,000,000 for the NADR Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) program. Funding a new CVE

program has required rebalancing the other NADR accounts of ATA, TIP/PISCES, CTF, and CTE.

The Fiscal Year 2011 budget request also reflects my three priorities: countering violent extremism (a new program), capacity building through our ATA, TIP/PISCES, and CTF programs, and multilateral engagement through our CTE program. Underlying all of these, and not always measurable in dollars, is a renewed and vigorous effort to ensure that diplomacy plays a central role in our counterterrorism (CT) efforts, as we emphasize the mutual interests that bind us together with our partners in our CT efforts.

To successfully develop and implement effective CT programs, we must understand the dynamics of the local conditions that give rise to extremism. In terms of countering violent extremism, every community, whether long-rooted or part of a new diaspora, possesses a unique political, economic, and social landscape. For this reason, one-size-fits-all CT programs are likely to have limited appeal and utility. Instead, our efforts must be tailored to fit the particular context. Thus, it is critically important that our Embassies, which are on the front lines of our counterterrorism efforts, play a key role in designing counterterrorism programs. They can best identify credible local partners who can carry moderating messages and successfully implement counterterrorism programs. For this reason,

I, my five deputies, and our staff have travelled extensively, especially to the Middle East, South Asia, Southeast Asia, Africa, and Europe. We have met with numerous officials from State, Defense and other departments as well as host governments and other organizations to discuss and support Chief of Mission-led efforts on counterterrorism and explore ways to further strengthen these initiatives.

Let me turn to a brief discussion of each of our key programs, according to the three priorities I have already laid out.

COUNTERING VIOLENT EXTREMISM (CVE) PROGRAM

The Fiscal Year 2011 request for the NADR Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) program is \$15 million. This is a newly created, dedicated program that goes beyond the tactical approaches to counterterrorism developed over the past nine years. It seeks to reduce the production of terrorists by using multiple tools to create alternatives for potential militants to choose non-violent paths.

In the past eight years, the United States has made great strides in what might be called tactical counterterrorism –disrupting terrorist cells and operations. But an effective counterterrorism strategy must go beyond efforts to thwart those who seek to harm the United States and its citizens, allies, and interests. Military

power, intelligence operations, and law enforcement efforts alone will not solve the long-term challenge the United States faces – the threat of violent extremism. As President Obama succinctly put it, “A campaign against extremism will not succeed with bullets or bombs alone.”

Curtailing the influence of militants is critical to enhancing our nation’s security. The primary goal of countering violent extremism is to stop those most at risk of radicalization from becoming terrorists. Its tools are non-coercive and include social programs, counter-ideology initiatives, and working with civil society to delegitimize the al-Qa’ida narrative and, where possible, provide positive alternative narratives. Because a variety of social and political factors can affect how people respond to al-Qa’ida, we are working from various angles to discredit their arguments and reduce their persuasiveness. Effectively countering the al-Qa’ida narrative involves capacity-building, outreach to civil society organizations, and educational development, as much as it does direct messaging. It involves working through host governments and non-governmental organizations to engage with clerics and other influential voices with credibility in local communities.

In Fiscal Year 2011, we intend to use countering violent extremism (CVE) funding to focus on hot-spots of radicalization and recruitment, working with

embassies to develop locally-tailored programs to counter the factors driving at-risk populations toward violence. In many cases, S/CT will implement these programs through existing offices and infrastructures including the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs, the State Department Special Representative to Muslim Communities, and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) to make sure that efforts to engage civil society and counter radicalizing narratives to avoid duplication and to collectively focus in the right areas. The Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau also have begun to address transparency and rule of law challenges on issues that feed the extremist narrative.

Because I consider this mission vital, one of the first things I did after being sworn in as coordinator was to start developing a CVE team, something that previously had not been a part of the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. We now have a six-person unit responsible for CVE programs.

Last fall my office convened a one-day interagency summit to examine U.S. government efforts in countering violent extremism, identify programmatic shortcomings, and make recommendations for creating a sustainable strategy going forward. The Summit brought together senior participants from the National

Security Council (NSC), the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), and the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), intelligence agencies, and the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, and Justice. All were in agreement that our programs are often more effective when informed by local knowledge and implemented by host nations, non-governmental organizations, and local partners.

We are working hard to develop a variety of CVE programs. One that is already in its third year is the Ambassadors' Fund for Counterterrorism, previously funded under NADR/ATA but moved to NADR/CVE in Fiscal Year 2011. The Ambassadors' Fund allows Posts to identify local partners and submit proposals to secure funding up to \$100,000 per project for local efforts to counter extremism. The Ambassadors' Fund is an example of a locally-targeted, field-driven program that marries the tools of soft power and counterterrorism assistance to help combat extremism. Our Ambassadors consistently express their appreciation for the program.

We also have an excellent relationship with the Department of Defense (DoD) on CVE. We are extremely grateful to Secretary Gates for his leadership and emphasis on the need to foster a stronger partnership between the Departments of Defense and State. Our cooperation with DoD is paying off as we explore ways

to collaborate and innovate new CVE programming. Together we are learning how to complement each other's strengths and efforts in the field, and determine which CVE efforts are best done by the military and which are best handled on the civilian side. A number of offices in DoD and the Combatant Commands that fund CVE projects and research have expressed a desire to collaborate with us on new programs and we have had fruitful discussions with the U.S. Special Operations Command (SOCOM) about how our offices can work in concert on funding good ideas and program delivery.

We need to ensure that we have the right authorities in place to successfully execute our CVE mission. Our FY 2011 appropriations request has revised NADR language that broadens the definition of antiterrorism to include countering radicalization and violent extremism.

CAPACITY BUILDING

TERRORIST INTERDICTION PROGRAM/

PERSONAL IDENTIFICATION SECURE COMPARISON AND

EVALUATION SYSTEM (TIP/PISCES) PROGRAM

The Fiscal Year 2011 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) request for the TIP/PISCES program is \$43.05 million.

The Terrorist Interdiction Program (TIP) seeks to constrain terrorist mobility globally by helping countries at risk of terrorist activity to enhance their border security capabilities. TIP provides participating countries with a computerized stop-list system known as the Personal Identification Secure Comparison and Evaluation System (PISCES). TIP installs PISCES hardware and software at selected ports of entry in consultation with host governments, usually including international airports and major border crossings.

In Fiscal Year 2011, we will use \$33.65 million to continue upgrade deployments begun in Fiscal Year 2010, in order to provide significant biometric software and hardware enhancements that will assist 17 partner nations to better identify and track individuals entering and departing their land, sea, and air ports of entry. Current TIP/PISCES host nations stop-list capabilities are vulnerable to efforts by terrorists to disguise identity and avoid identity confirmation, and biometrics enhancements will reduce this vulnerability. In Fiscal Year 2011 biometric upgrades are planned for: Cambodia, Djibouti, Ethiopia, Ivory Coast, Kosovo, Macedonia, Thailand, Uganda, and Zambia.

Three TIP/PISCES programs illustrate the overall program:

- In Kenya, within the last two weeks, a pilot program for PISCES biometric upgrades has been launched at Jomo Kenyatta International Airport in Nairobi. Initial testing has shown positive results for 10-print fingerprint capture. Assuming satisfactory pilot results by the end of April, we plan to begin deployment of full biometric upgrades in Kenya and other key countries. We are pleased that development of PISCES biometric upgrades has proceeded smoothly and on schedule.
- In Pakistan, the number of ports of entry using PISCES has expanded to 26, including 15 airports, five land borders, four seaports, and two train stations. Pakistan will be among the first few nations implementing biometrics upgrades. As in all countries using the PISCES system, Pakistani officials are able to document the arrival and departure of international travelers and identify suspect travelers against a host-nation developed stop-list.
- In Yemen, the number of ports of entry using the PISCES system has expanded to 24, including six airports, six land borders, and 12 seaports. The original PISCES software installed in Yemen has been upgraded in the last six months in preparation for further biometrics upgrades.

ANTITERRORISM ASSISTANCE (ATA) PROGRAM

The Fiscal Year 2011 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) request for the Antiterrorism Assistance (ATA) program is \$205.1 million.

ATA continues to be our flagship counterterrorism law enforcement capacity-building program and our partner nations have registered several concrete successes over the last year. I would like to highlight a few of the initiatives and developments we have planned for the coming fiscal year.

In the Philippines, we hope to increase funding by 80 percent to almost \$9 million in order to ramp up efforts to transition counterterrorism (CT) training from the military to civilian law enforcement in the south. This transition is crucial to consolidating the gains made during the last few years while firmly establishing civilian rule of law.

In Afghanistan, we are requesting a 25 percent increase to \$23 million in the ATA bilateral budget in order to complete the hand-off of President Karzai's protective detail to the Government of Afghanistan and also to extend our training program to Detachment 10 (D-10), which provides protection for government facilities and senior officials. This will build on our successes in protective detail

training and support efforts to directly secure government officials and facilities by focusing our training on an organization with the capacity to absorb it.

Under our Fiscal Year 2011 request, India's ATA bilateral budget would almost double to \$4.5 million in order to meet the increasing needs and increasing willingness to cooperate on the part of the Indian government, which recently has requested more and higher-level training in the aftermath of the Mumbai attack.

The State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL) Bureau have increased cooperation on law enforcement with joint assessments between ATA and INL in high priority countries such as the Philippines. More broadly, we are working with INL and PM and other bureaus that manage security sector assistance programs to ensure greater unity and strengthen our efforts to build our partners' capacity.

COUNTERTERRORISM FINANCE TRAINING (CTF) PROGRAM

The FY 2011 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) request for the Counterterrorism Finance Training (CTF) Program is \$20.95 million.

The CTF mission is to develop and provide counterterrorism finance training and technical assistance to countries most critical to terrorist financing. These CTF programs are aimed at reinforcing partner countries' financial regulatory, judicial, and law enforcement institutions to detect, disrupt, and dismantle terrorist financing networks. The State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism is charged with directing, managing, and coordinating all U.S. government agencies' efforts to develop and provide these CTF programs. The State Department Coordinator for Counterterrorism and the International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs Bureau co-chair the State Department-led interagency Terrorist Finance Working Group (TFWG) to ensure harmonization on CTF capacity-building efforts. The TFWG meets biweekly, receives intelligence updates, schedules assessment trips, reviews assessment reports, evaluates training proposals, and assigns resources for training.

Along with the Administration, Congress has realized that stopping these illicit flows are a key part of our overall counterterrorism strategy. We have had importance successes. Without going into classified material, our capacity-building programs have provided the skills and knowledge to our foreign partners that have resulted in the capture of terrorist financiers. With the additional funding, we will be able to expand our efforts, not only focusing on key countries such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq, but sources further afield that fund the terrorists in

these countries. Additionally, we are looking to increasingly important threat areas, such as Yemen and North Africa, and how we might address their sources of funding.

COUNTERTERRORISM ENGAGEMENT (CTE) PROGRAM

The Fiscal Year 2011 Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism, Demining and Related Programs (NADR) request for the Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) program is \$10 million.

Counterterrorism Engagement (CTE) aims to build political will among foreign government officials and civil societies, and support the efforts of multilateral organizations to promote more effective policies and programs.

Working with other government agencies and with nongovernmental organizations, the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism uses CTE to support initiatives and training including through the United Nations and regional organizations. Such multilateral engagement allows us to leverage our contributions with those of other countries, thus achieving greater international buy-in, more efficiencies, and more long-lasting results.

We will use \$5 million in CTE funds in FY2011 to improve U.S. multilateral engagement. The United States places a great importance on engaging with the international community to combat terrorism, especially through multilateral organizations including the United Nations and regional organizations such as the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the Organization of American States (OAS), and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Major focus areas of this work involves both setting norms that member countries can be held to, and carrying out capacity-building work through organizations that have the credibility of consensus behind them. We plan to support United Nations bodies including Counter-Terrorism Committee Executive Directorate (CTED), United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), and the wider Counter-Terrorism Implementation Task Force which can each make important contributions to this effort.

We've worked closely with the Canadian Presidency of the G8's Counterterrorism Action Group (CTAG) to reform its focus on specific regions where there are clear threats. For example, our specific engagement with the CTAG in priority countries and regions, most notably in the Sahel, will strengthen capacity building efforts. Our continued engagement with regional bodies, including the OSCE, OAS's Inter-American Committee on Terrorism (CICTE),

and APEC offers opportunities to develop new and strengthen existing regional mechanisms aimed at helping countries implement international standards to combat terrorism and to increase our CT cooperation.

This increased funding will help the United States build political will among foreign government officials and civil societies, and support the efforts of multilateral organizations to promote more effective policies and programs.

We will also use \$5 million in CTE funds to increase support for the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI).

THE REGIONAL STRATEGIC INITIATIVE (RSI)

Terrorists operate without regard to national boundaries. To effectively counter terrorists, we are working to strengthen our regional and transnational partnerships and to increasingly operate in a regional context. Denying safe haven plays a major role in undermining terrorists' capacity to operate effectively and forms a key element of U.S. counterterrorism strategy. Through the Regional Strategic Initiative (RSI), we work with Ambassadors and interagency representatives in key terrorist theaters of operation to assess the threat and devise collaborative strategies, action plans, and policy recommendations. To implement this strategy, U.S. Ambassadors lead interagency Country Teams that recommend

strategies using all instruments of U.S. statecraft to help host nations understand the threat, and strengthen their political will and capacity to counter it.

The RSI promotes cooperation between our counterterrorism partners, for example, between Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines as they confront terrorist transit across the Sulawesi Sea; or among Mauritania, Algeria, Morocco, Niger, Chad, and Mali, to counter al-Qa'ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).

The RSI is funded primarily from NADR ATA, CTE, and CTF funds, but is also funded from various other budget programs. For example, as mentioned by Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs Shapiro, his bureau has requested Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) funds for the Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership (TSCTP) and the East Africa Regional Strategic Initiative (EARSI). These important RSIs enhance the ability of states to address counterterrorism threats through regional coordination and cooperation.

These two RSIs, along with the six others, allow us to address transnational threats through regional programs, as agreed to by Ambassadors in the field, and according to a common set of CT objectives for each region. Having RSI funds under multiple accounts allows us to execute programs with a variety of assistance tools to address the most pressing threats, with leadership from the field. RSI

funds are allocated from our global line in the year of execution, according to a competitive proposal process, and managed and overseen by our RSI regional officers in the field.

CONCLUSION

We in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, take our responsibilities in managing the more than \$294 million in security assistance funds requested for Fiscal Year 2011 very seriously.

Managing and implementing the five security assistance programs I have outlined form a substantial part of the essential partnership among the Departments of State, Defense, Homeland Security, Justice, Treasury, and the intelligence community. In the dynamic environment we face today, with its constantly changing set of challenges and opportunities, funding of these counterterrorism assistance programs provides our government with the necessary and flexible tools to advance U.S. national security interests around the globe.

There are two more points I'd like to make. First, as we pursue our CVE work and counterterrorism more broadly, it is vital that we honor and exemplify our values in this struggle. As President Obama has said from the outset, there should be no tradeoff between our security and our values. Indeed, in light of what

we know about radicalization, it is clear that navigating by our values is an essential, indeed indispensable, part of a successful counterterrorism effort. Thus, we have forbidden torture, and are developing a more systematic method of dealing with detainees. All of these, over the long term, will help undermine terrorist claims about the nature of the United States.

Secondly, there is reason for optimism about our ability to make progress on counterterrorism. Within the foreign policy community and the senior political leadership, there is a broad, shared understanding of the vital need to get this right. I am confident that we can succeed at this strategic level of counterterrorism as effectively as we have in the tactical realm, where we have made genuinely impressive strides.

Thank you for the time and opportunity to appear before you today to discuss these programs. With that, I look forward to taking your questions.

